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Abstract
This Note examines the Government Procurement Code and its impact on United States-Japan
trade relations. It begins with a summary of discriminatory procurement practices previously
permitted by the United States and Japan, followed by a brief history of the Code. The Note
then addresses the Code’s operative mechanisms and its effect on United States and Japanese
procurement practices. Finally, it considers the NTT Agreement as an illustration of the Code’s
potential for opening the Japanese market to foreign suppliers.
NOTES
UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE
DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE
MTN AGREEMENT ON
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT
INTRODUCTION
The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN),
concluded on April 12, 1979,1 significantly advanced multilateral
efforts to eliminate non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to trade.2  While
1. AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF THE MULTI-LATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS, _ U.S.T. -, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th CONC., 1st SEss., pt. 1
(1979) [hereinafter cited as MTN]. The impetus for the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations was the "Tokyo Declaration," a result of a ministerial meeting of nearly 100
nations in Tokyo in September 1973, to advocate the reduction of trade barriers among
nations. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Tokyo Declaration on Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, September 14, 1973, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Press
Release GATT/1134, para. 9, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1533 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Tokyo Declaration]. Although the GATT discussions pursuant to the Tokyo Declara-
tion were dubbed the "Tokyo Round," actual negotations were held at GATT headquarters
in Geneva.
Established as a reaction against the excessive protectionist trade policies of the 1930's,
the GATT sought to raise worldwide standards of living, assure full employment, increase
the growth of real income and market demand and to expand the production of goods. These
goals were to be achieved through "the substantial reduction of tariffs and other trade
barriers and to the elimination of preferences, on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous
basis." The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, concluded Oct. 30, 1947, 61 STAT. A3,
A7, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 188 [hereinafter cited as GATT]. See generally J.
JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 329-32 (1969). As a stand-by agreement to
put into immediate effect many of the provisions of the Havana Charter, the GATT required
its initial members to sign the Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade signed at Geneva, on October 30, 1947, 61 STAT. A2051, T.I.A.S. No.
1700; 55 U.N.T.S. 308, effective January 1, 1948. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS 1149 (2d Ed. 1976). Still applied through this Protocol, the GATT has
become the legal cornerstone for international trade, binding eighty-five signatory countries.
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, STATUS OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS, GATT/LEG/1
[hereinafter cited as GATT STATUS], 3 Accessions.
2. Non-tariff barriers fall under the general rubric of trade-distorting policies. One
author has defined trade-distorting policies as:
any measure (public or private) that causes internationally traded goods and serv-
ices, or resources devoted to the production of these goods and services, to be
allocated in such a way as to reduce potential real world income. Potential real
world income is that level attainable if resources and outputs are allocated in an
economically efficient manner.
R. BALDWIN, NONTARIFF DISTORTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 (1970). A non-tariff barrier
would be any such measure exclusive of tariffs. Some examples of non-tariff barriers are:
subsidies, import licensing systems, customs valuation methods, product standards and gov-
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previous rounds of negotiations conducted pursuant to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) focused primarily on the
reduction of tariffs,3 the Tokyo Round undertook the removal of
NTBs4 through a complex system of disciplinary codes of con-
ernment purchasing requirements. Strauss, Symposium on the Multilateral Trade Agree-
ments l-Foreward, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1257 (1979). The Secretariat for the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has enumerated over 800 NTBs. Id. Non-tariff barriers are
also referred to as non-tariff measures (NTMs) and non-tariff distortions (NTDs) to trade.
The term NTB is used in this Note simply because it appears to have gained the greatest
acceptance. See also R. BALDWIN, supra, at 2 n.4. From its inception, the signatories of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade intended to eliminate NTBs. Part II of the GATT,
Articles III to XXIII, specifically address NTBs such as dumping, customs valuations, quanti-
tative restrictions on trade and subsidies. Unlike Parts I and III of the GATT which require
unconditional application by the signatories, Part II requires only that its provisions be
applied "to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing legislation." Protocol of Provi-
sional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, supra note 1. Because
GATT signatories encountered difficulties in trying to deal with NTBs, i.e., identifying
NTBs, working out procedures, monitoring, obtaining implementing legislation, etc., no
serious attempt to address NTBs occurred before the Tokyo Round. See R. BALDWIN, supra,
at 1-3.
3. The six earlier rounds of GATT were held in: Geneva, Switzerland, 1947; Annecy,
France, 1949; Torquay, England, 1951; Geneva, Switzerland, 1955-56; Geneva, Switzer-
land, 1960-62 (the "Dillon Round"); Geneva, Switzerland, 1964-67 (the "Kennedy Round").
K. DAM, THE GATT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 56 (1970). Follow-
ing the Kennedy Round tariff cuts on dutiable nonagricultural goods averaged over 35 % for
the United States, European Economic Community, United Kingdom and Japan, and cov-
ered approximately $20 billion in trade. This left the United States with an average tariff on
nonagricultural goods at 9.9%, the EEC 8.6%, the United Kingdom 10.8% and Japan
10.7%. R. BALDWIN, supra note 2, at 1. The Kennedy Round addressed two non-tariff
matters, an antidumping code and customs valuation, but the resulting agreements were not
implemented by Congress. Brown, The New International Government Procurement Code
Under GATT, 53 N.Y. ST. B.J. 198 n.4 (1981); Marks & Malmgren, Negotiating Non-tariff
Distortions to Trade, 7 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 327, 333-34 (1975). In addition, one NTB,
quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons, had been virtually eliminated in
earlier rounds of GATT. R. BALWIN, supra note 2, at 2. Commenting on the rise in NTBs
relative to the decline of tariff barriers, one perceptive author stated: "the lowering of tariffs
has, in effect, been like draining a swamp. The lower water level has revealed all the snags
and stumps of non-tariff barriers that still have to be cleared away .. ." Jones, N.Y. Times,
July 10, 1968, quoted in R. Baldwin, supra note 2, at 2. See Note, The Trade Agreements
Act of 1979: The Agreement on Government Procurement, 14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 321, 322
(1980) [hereinafter cited as TAA of 1979].
4. The basis for negotiating NTBs was paragraph 3(b) of the Tokyo Declaration, which
set out to "reduce or eliminate non-tariff measures or, where this is not appropriate, to
reduce or eliminate their trade restricting or distorting effects, and to bring such measures
under more effective international discipline." Tokyo Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3(b).
Although tariffs were also an important aspect of the negotiations, the principal objective of
the Tokyo Round was the elimination, reduction, harmonization of certain non-tariff bar-
riers. See Hearing on Implementation of the NTT Procurement Agreement Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance of the Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, -Cong.,-Sess. 40 (June 9, 1981) (statement of Robert
Cassidy) (Transcript obtained from the United States Embassy, Tokyo. Copy on file at the
Fordham International Law Journal office.) [hereinafter cited as NTT Hearing].
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duct. 5 This undertaking has been considered by many to be
GATT's most ambitious attempt to liberalize the international eco-
nomic order.6 One major achievement of the MTN is the Agree-
ment on Government Procurement7 (hereinafter referre/ to as
5. The Tokyo Round agreements on NTBs have been commonly referred to as "codes."
See Strauss, supra note Z, at 1258; Bus. AM., Feb. 23, 1981, at 3, 11; JAPAN ECONOMIC
INSTITUTE, JAPAN INSIGHT, No. 11, at 9 (Mar. 20, 1981). The codes are disciplinary in the
sense that they prescribe new rules and procedures which require a gradual alteration and
formalization of government and business behavior, and contain dispute provisions providing
for relief from injury caused by a signatory. Previous GATT rounds were largely "self-execut-
ing"; they involved automatic, phased tariff cuts. The Tokyo Round Agreements, on the
other hand, covering a much broader and complex field of NTBs, require permanent moni-
toring, interpretation and negotiation. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GATT
ACTIVITIES IN 1980, at 8 (1981). Eleven agreements were completed at the MTN in addition
to the ones concerning tariffs and a provision within GATT for a permanent legal basis for
preferential trade treatment on behalf of, and between, developing countries. Six of these
agreements specifically addressed non-tariff barriers: Subsidies and Countervailing Duties,
Technical Barriers to Trade, Import Licensing, Government Procurement, Customs Valua-
tion and Revised Anti-Dumping Code. The other agreements include: Framework for the
Conduct of World Trade, Bovine Meat, Dairy Products, Tropical Products and an Agree-
ment on Trade and Civil Aircraft. MTN, supra note 1. See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFs
AND TRADE, GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1979, at 5-36 (1980). The Customs Valuation and Govern-
ment Procurement-codes were the last of the MTN agreements to go into effect. They entered
into force on January 1, 1981. Id. at 9; JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE, supra, at 9.
6. See GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TAmFFS AND TRADE, GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1979 at 9
(1980); GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GATT ACTIVITIES IN 1978 at 11-12
(1979); Marks & Malmgren, supra note 3, at 327; President's Remarks on Signing the Trade
Agreements Act of 1979 Into Law, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF Pars. Doc. 1311 (July 26, 1979).
7. Agreement on Government Procurement, April 12, 1979, T.I.A.S. No._ [here-
inafter cited as GPA], reprinted in AGREEMENTS REACHED IN THE TOKYO ROUND OF MULTILA-
TERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I at 67-189 (1979)
(The House Report, supra, refers to the Articles of the Agreement on Government Procure-
ment as "Parts." Commentators, the GATT sources and others, however, more commonly
refer to these divisions as "Articles." Hereinafter, in keeping with the vast weight of the
GATT related literature, the term "Articles" shall be used). The negotiators at the MTN had
different approaches which could have been taken to harmonize, reduce or eliminate trade
barriers. Article III of GATT excludes government procurement expressly from its national
treatment, and, indirectly from its most-favored-nation (MFN) obligations. One way of
initiating an agreement on government procurement would have been to draft an amend-
ment to the GATT. A two-thirds vote of approval by signatory countries, however, is
necessary to amend Article III, and a unanimous vote is required to amend Article I (MFN
status)-a vote which has been nearly impossible to attain in recent times. GATT, supra note
1, art. XXX. An alternative to amendment involved the implementation of a supplementary
code open to signature by other parties which desire to obtain its benefits and shoulder its
obligations. This was the approach that the negotiators in the Tokyo Round of MTN adopted
when developing the Code on Government Procurement. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL
TRADE COMMISSION, 6 MTN STUDIS: AGREEMENTS BEING NEGOTIATED AT THE MULTILATERAL
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, PART 3, ANALYSIS OF NONTARIFF AGREEMENTS, prepared Jor
the SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE; 96TH CONG., 1st Sess.
211-212 (Comm. Print (96-27) 1979) [hereinafter cited as MTN STUDY].
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Government Procurement Code or Code). The Code seeks to elimi-
nate the non-tariff barrier of discriminatory treatment of foreign
suppliers in government procurement contracts. 8
During the course of the MTN talks in Geneva, a dispute9
arose between the United States and Japan concerning the extent of
Japanese procurement to be covered under the Code.' 0 More spe-
8. Basically, the Agreement on Government Procurement endeavors to increase compe-
tition in the international procurement market. See GENERAL AGPEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE, GATT AcrivTIES IN 1978 at 33-34 (1979). Greater competition should save taxpayers
money in government purchases of goods, reallocate those savings to more productive areas
of the economy and benefit suppliers, either domestic or foreign, who are the most efficient.
See id.; TAA of 1979, supra note 3, at 326. This reasoning is based on the theory of
comparative advantage generally attributed to David Ricardo in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, which asserts the proposition that nations should specialize in those sectors of the
economy which enjoy the greatest relative efficiency to other countries, even if a nation is not
the most efficient producer. See C. KINDELBERGER & P. LINDERT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
16 (6th ed. 1978), cited in TAA of 1979, supra note 3, at 326 n.28. Such emphasis on
"comparative advantage," maximizes the real income of a nation, but only if there is a free
flow of goods to allow each nation to share in the cheaper products of efficient industries
abroad. Trade barriers such as discriminatory procurement are thus inefficient to the extent
that they impede free trade. TAA of 1979, supra note 3, at 326. For a general discussion on
discriminatory government procurement, see notes 35-41 infra and accompanying text.
9. This acrimonious and highly publicized debate took place from January to June
1979. UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE COUNCIL, COUNCIL REPORT, No. 6, at 3 (Feb. 8, 1980). See
also note 187 infra for a discussion of the origins of the dispute.
10. NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, INDUSTRIAL REvIEW OF JAPAN, 1980 at 84 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as IRJ]. The Code was negotiated at the MTN in two stages. The first stage
undertook to develop the Code, i.e., formulate rules and procedures to implement the basic
principle of non-discrimination in government procurement. NTT Hearing, supra note 4, at
10 (statement of W. Douglas Newkirk). The second stage sought to arrive at an equitable
arrangement for reciprocal opportunities under the Code. In other words, each country had
to offer a list of central governmental entities-ministries, departments, agencies, etc.-to be
covered under the Code's provisions. A yen-to-dollar, or ministry-to-department basis, for
example, was insufficient to determine equitableness. Rather, a judgment had to be made
purely on commercial terms. Hormats, MTN Codes and Telecommunications: Toward an
Equitable Balance (testimony before the House Ways and Means Subcomm. on Trade, Sept.
18, 1980), reprinted in 2 SPEAKING OF JAPAN, No. 3, June 1981 at 19. The United States took a
maximalist approach and offered all of its major purchasing entities in the hope that other
governments would follow. However, because some of the United States' key negotiating
partners were unwilling to submit all of their entities, most notably the European Economic
Community (EEC) in their offers of telecommunications, power generating and transporta-
tion equipment, the United States withdrew such entities as the T.V.A., the Army Corps of
Engineers, and the Department of Transportation from bids by European Economic Com-
munity manufacturers. NTT Hearing, supra note 4, at 11 (statement of W. Douglas
Newkirk). See generally Bus. AM., Feb. 23, 1981, at 5, 6. In the case of Japan, all of its
central government ministries were offered, so on a theoretical basis there appeared to be
parity. The United States, however, felt that the offer was inadequate. Japan conducts much
of its purchasing through public corporations and its procurement system is highly decentral-
ized. This meant that a large portion of Japan's procurement would be exempt or below the
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cifically, the dispute involved entity coverageI' of the Nippon Tele-
phone & Telegraph Public Corporation (NTT), a quasi-public mo-
nopoly whose annual purchasing totalled an estimated $3.3
billion. 2  Although the United States and Japan completed the five
years' 3 of Tokyo Round negotiations as general signatories to the
minimum contract price under the Code. NTT Hearing, supra note 4, at 12 (statement of
W. Douglas Newkirk) (see notes 118-128 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Code's exemptions).
11. See note 10 supra for a discussion of entity coverage. The extent to which entity
offerings would actually provide commercial opportunities for a negotiating partner was a
vital issue in the discussion on entity coverage. NTT Hearing, supra note 4, at 13 (statement
of W. Douglas Newkirk). Thus, the United States could only achieve a balance by gaining
access to Japan's procurement in areas where it was competitive, such as telecommunica-
tions, power generating and aircraft equipment. Id. at 41 (statement of Robert Cassidy). It
became apparent to the United States that the Nippon Telephone & Telegraph Public
Corporation (NTT) (see note 12 infra for a further description of NTT) was the only Japanese
entity whose inclusion under the Code would provide this necessary balance; NTT buys
centrally in large quantities, including high-technology products. Hormats, supra note 10, at
19-20.
12. Japan Econ. J. (Int'l Weekly Ed. of Nihon Keizai Shimbun) [hereinafter cited as
Nihon Keizai Shimbun], Dec. 23, 1980, at 1, col. 1. NTT is a quasi-public corporation whose
budget is approved by the Diet, Japan's legislature, and is under the nominal control of the
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT), SU3COMMITTEE ON TRADE OF THE COMMIT-
TEE ON WAYS AND MEANS AND THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE TASK FORCE, 96th CONG., 2d
8EsS., REPoirr ON UNITED STATES-JAPAN TRADE 26 (Comm. Print (96-68) 1980) [hereinafter
cited as U.S.-JAPAN TRADE REPORT]. Operating as virtually a monopoly in the Japanese
telecommunications system, NTT is the largest buyer of telecommunications equipment in
Japan. Weil & Click, Japan-Is the Market Open? A View of the Japanese Market Drawn
from U.S. Corporate Experience, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus, 845, 880 (1979). Of its total
revenues of over 4 trillion yen in 1980 (approximately $15 billion), domestic telephone
services accounted for 88%, telegraph 1.6%, and leased circuit service 6.3%. Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, Sept. 8, 1981 at 9, col. 2. Among its many functions are the construction of
large-scale telecommunications systems, the laying of cable, and purchase of equipment for
lease to its end-users and private subscribers. Weil & Glick, supra at 880. Although govern-
ment owned, NTT is virtually autonomous. It is a profit-making corporation similar to the
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. (ATT). NTT Hearing, supra note 4, at 41 (statement
of Robert Cassidy). Since the Code exempts entities not under the "direct or substantial
control" of central governments, NTT's inclusion was a matter of contention in the early
stages of the negotiations. See note 119 infra and accompanying text. Hormats, supra note
10, at 20. However, Japan soon realized that the United States was adamant about NTT
coverage under the Code, and added NTT to its entity list. CPA, supra note 7, Annex I; see
NTT Hearing, supra note 4, at 13 (statement of W. Douglas Newkirk). They were left with
the problem of how much of the $3.3 billion of NTT would be included under the Code.
13. The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations began in early February,
1974, when the Trade Negotiations Committee adopted a detailed work program pursuant to
the Tokyo Declaration. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, GATT ACTIVITIES IN
1973, at 13 (1974). The negotiations were concluded on April 12, 1979. See note I supra and
accompanying text.
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Code,14 the dispute regarding entity coverage continued.' 5  On
June 2, 1979, the United States and Japan issued a joint statement
providing that an agreement .would be concluded by December 31,
1980, the last day before the Code was to go into effect. 16 1 After a
year and a half of often bitter negotiations, 17 the two countries
reached an agreement on December 19, 198018 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as NTT Agreement). Under the NTT Agreement, Japan
offered to the United States access to all of NTT's telecommunica-
tions purchases 19 as well as a commitment to liberalize its domestic
14. GATT STATUS, supra note 1, 16 Multilateral Trade Negotiations 1973-79, 16-5.1/
16-5.2, Agreement on Government Procurement, Done at Geneva on 12 April 1979, BISD
265, _ U.N.T.S.-. The signatories to the Code are Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Finland, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Japan, Nigeria,
Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, and the United States.
15. N.Y. Times, March. 30, 1979, § D, at 1, col. 6. Japan (subject to completion of
Constitutional procedures) and the United States (subject to satisfactory completion of nego-
tiations on entity coverage) formally accepted the Agreement on Government Procurement
on December 17, 1979. GATT STATUS, supra note 1. At the end of the Tokyo Round the
United States had succeeded in achieving reciprocal entity arrangements with all of its major
trading partners except Japan. Hormats, supra note 10, at 19. Similarly, Japan had estab-
lished entity parity with its trading partners, but had agreed to continue negotiations with
the United States. The Code provides that it "shall not apply as between any two Parties if
either of the Parties, at the time either accepts or accedes to [it], does not consent to such
application." Id. art. IX, para. 9. An agreement between Japan and the United States,
therefore, was necessary for reciprocal procurement access under the Code. See Pomeranz,
Toward a New International Order in Government Procurement, 11 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 1263, 1292-93 (1979).
16. Joint Statement of Ambassador Strauss and Minister Ushiba, June 2, 1979, reprinted
in U.S.-JAPAN TRADE REPORT, supra note 12, at 84 [hereinafter cited as Joint Statement June
2.] N.Y. Times, June 3, 1979, § 1, at 9, col. 1. Although the Code was completed on April 12,
1979 and formally accepted on December 17, 1979, it did not go into force until January 1,
1981. GPA, supra note 7, art. IX, para. 3.
17. JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE, JAPAN INSIGHT, No. 47, at 2 (Dec. 19, 1980). For a
discussion of this dispute, see note 187 infra.
18. Agreement on Procurement in Telecommunications, December 19, 1980, United
States-Japan, T.I.A.S. No. 9961, reprinted in E. Asian Exec. Reps., Jan. 15, 1981, at 24-30
[hereinafter cited as NTT Agreement]. The agreement consisted of four documents: (1)
exchange letters between the Japanese Representative for External Economic Relations
(JREEA), Dr. Saburo Okita, and the United States Trade Representative, (USTR), Reubin
O'D. Askew; (2) an appended document attached to the Okita letter under the caption "NTT
PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES" (Attachment I); (3) another appended document to the Okita
letter labelled "Procedures of Non-binding Arbitration" (Attachment II); and (4) a Joint
Statement concerning reciprocal liberalization of the interconnect market (Joint Statement).
Id. See also 22 HABv. INT'L L.J. 464-473 (1981).
19. The final NTT procurement settlement was a two part package. The first part
involved purchases of non-public telecommunications equipment, or Track I purchasing.
The United States and other signatories to the Code have a legal right to non-discriminatory
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interconnect market. 20  Both the Agreement and the Code became
effective on January 1, 1981. l
These agreements are significant to Japan and the United
States and to the international economic order. Japanese consumers
and taxpayers should benefit directly from their government's ac-
cess to new equipment and technology at competitive prices.22
United States industries should be able to increase exports to Ja-
pan, 2 3 thereby reducing the current trade imbalance. 24  Moreover,
competitive access to this portion of NTT procurement, approximately $1.5 billion. NTT
Agreement, supra note 18, letter of Dr. Saburo Okita, Attachment I, para. 2. NTT Hearing,
supra note 4, at 22 (statement of Raymond J. Waldmann). The remainder of NTT's pur-
chases falls directly under the NTT Agreement, a bilateral arrangement entitling the United
States to about $1.8 billion of NTT's procurement of public telecommunications equipment
or Track II and Track III purchasing. Id. Despite the fact that the Code's procedures do not
set forth the specific procedures needed for high-technology and joint research-oriented
procurement, NTT is committed to adhere to non-discriminatory Code principles under this
agreement. Id., at 22-23 (statement of Raymond J. Waldmann).
20. NTT Agreement, supra note 18, Joint Statement. In the earlier joint statement of
June 2, 1979, Japan agreed to provide mutual reciprocal market access opportunities in the
telecommunications field. Joint Statement of June 2, supra note 16. This meant that negotia-
tions by the United States and Japan on telecommunications would encompass NTT's open-
ing both government procurement and the Japanese interconnect market (customer-provided
leased-line equipment). See Japan: Is the Market Open?, 27 JAPAN REPOrT, June-July, 1981,
at 9. NTT virtually monopolizes the domestic telecommunications circuits and imposes strict
restrictions on the use of leased circuits (interconnect market). Anyone who wishes to connect
customer-provided equipment to leased circuits must 6btain NTT's approval. Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, Apr. 7, 1981, at 9, col. 1. Foreign manufacturers wishing to enter Japan's
interconnect market have had difficulty in obtaining NTT's approval because of NTT's
complicated procedural requirements and imprecise specifications for equipment. In addi-
tion, NTT required a unit-by-unit installation approval system which severely impeded
foreign entry. See U.S.-JAPAN TRADE REPORT, supra note 12, at 27-28. The Joint Statement of
December 19, 1980, was intended to liberalize NTT's procedures regarding these problems.
NTT Agreement, supra note 18, Joint Statement.
21. NTT Agreement, supra note 18, letter of Dr. Saburo Okita. (NTT Agreement);
CPA, supra note 7, art. IX, para. 3 (Code).
22. For example, the United States telecommunications industry is regarded as highly
competitive internationally, and should be able to provide telecommunications equipment to
NTT at competitive prices. See Hormats, supra note 10, at 20. See also STAFF OF SUBCOMM.
ON TRADE OF THE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 96th CONG., 2d SEss., REPORT ON HIGH
TECHNOLOGY AND JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL POLICY: A STRATEGY FOR U.S. POLICY MAKERS (Comm.
Print (96-74) 1980), 37-38 [hereinafter cited as HIGH TECHNOLOGY REPORT]. This saving by
NTT should presumably translate into cheaper telephone services in the case of Japanese
consumers, and lower government costs in the case of taxpayers. See generally note 8 supra.
It should be noted that NTT represents only one of Japan's governmental entities that will be
open to procurement under the Code. See GPA, supra note 7, Annex I.
23. See U.S.-JAPAN TRADE REPORT, supra note 12, at 28-29. The Code and the NTT
Agreement are expected to open more than $8 billion of Japanese government contracts to
United States suppliers. These agreements, of course, only set up the conditions for open
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fair and open access to Japanese markets should create an atmo-
sphere more favorable to Japanese trade in the United States.2 5
There is a general consensus that both countries stand to benefit
greatly from a strengthening of the GATT system28 and the liberali-
competition. There is no automatic assurance that United States firms will gain a share of
such purchases. For the interconnect market and Track I purchasing of non-public telecom-
munications goods, United States firms must compete against other foreign firms as well as
domestic Japanese suppliers, which includes Japanese suppliers that have previously been
outside the "NTT family." See note 107 infra and accompanying text. Under Tracks II and
III purchasing of public telecommunications equipment, United States firms will only have
to compete against Japanese suppliers. See note 19 supra. For an analysis of the problems
which United States exporters face in penetrating the Japanese market, see Friedman &
Pucik, Obstacles to U.S. Exports to Japan-Not Insurmountable, Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
Apr. 7, 1981, at 20, col. 1.
24. In the last few years, the United States' trade deficit to Japan has increased from
$1.86 billion in 1975 to $9.9 billion in 1980. The 1981 deficit is estimated to be a record $15
billion. Lohr, Trade Barriers? It's Not All Tokyo's Fault, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1981, § E, at
5, col. 1. For a discussion of the trade deficit and its impact on United States-Japan trade
relations, see notes 32-33 infra.
25. An argument has been made that the crucial issue in present trade problems with
Japan is not Japan's aggressive export policies, but the urgent need by certain long-established
sectors of the United States economy to adjust to new economic situations. See Dunkel,
Japan's Role in Defense of Open Trading System, KEIDANREN REVIEW, No. 70, Aug. 1981, at
8. For a discussion of United States industrial competitiveness, see JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTI-
TUTE, JAPAN INSIGHT, No. 28, at 5-6 (July 24, 1981). Regardless of how accurate this
representation is, Japan's willingness to adjust its own restrictive import policies should
facilitate a more constructive approach to United States-Japan trade problems. Id. See
REPORT OF THE JAPAN-UNITED STATES ECONOMIC RELATIONS GROUP, Prepared for the Presi-
dent of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan (Jan. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
WISE MEN'S REPORT]. See also JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE, supra, at 6-7. For a discussion on
the efforts the Japanese Government is making to increase imports into Japan, see Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, July 28, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
26. The existing international economic order is largely the legacy of United States
leadership which created institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
GATT. Having emerged from World War II with a powerful agricultural and industrial
base, the United States was able to capitalize on the market environment that these institu-
tions facilitated-a stabilized currency and liberalized world trade, particularly in the form
of lower tariffs. See JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITrEE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 96TH
CONG. 1st SEss., THE U.S. ROLE IN A CHANGING WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY: MAJOR ISSUES
FOR THE 96TH CONGRESS 50-51 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as U.S. TRADE ROLE].
Hence through the 1950's and 1960's, the United States Government and the mainstream of
United States industry supported the GATT-IMF system. See Amaya, America's Deep-
Rooted Protectionism, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 7, 1981, at 20, col. 1. Despite a general
deterioration of these institutions during the 1970's (see U.S. TRADE ROLE, supra, at 5-22) the
basic objective of the GATT, international economic cooperation and trade liberalization, is
still considered to be an objective of all trading nations, particularly the United States. See id.
at 49. Although Japan did not join the GATT until some years after its inception it soon
became a beneficiary of, and dependent on, the GATT multilateral trading system which
facilitated an extraordinary 25-year boom in the world economy. As Arthur Dunkel, Direc-
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zation of international trade. 7 As the world's two largest market
economies,2 8 the manner in which the United States and Japan
conduct their trade policies sets an example for other countries to
follow 29 The extent to which they adhere to the free trade princi-
ples propounded by the GATT will have an important influence on
the GATT's effectiveness as a mechanism for resolving international
economic problems. 30
tor-General of the GATT, stated: "No country has made better use of the system than Japan.
No country would lose more if the effectiveness of the system were allowed to erode."
Dunkel, supra note 25, at 8. See also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 30, 1981, at 24, col. 3. For
a survey of GATT's legal operations, see generally R. HUDEC, THE GA'r LEGAL SYSTEM AND
WORLD TRADE DIPLOMACY.
27. See WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 1-2. Increased bilateral and global trade
liberalization and economic interdependence should benefit the two countries by stimulating
competition, expanding product choices, adding to available capital and technology and
enhancing overall economic efficiency. Id. at v. On a more quantitative level, the results of
the MTN's tariff cuts alone should amount to an annual gain of approximately $1 billion to
the United States economy. U.S. Trade Role, supra note 26, at 56. In the last decade United
States-Japan bilateral trade has grown by about 400% from $10.5 billion in 1970 to $51.5
billion in 1980. See WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra at 13; 27 JAPAN REPORT, supra note 20, at 10.
Each country is the other's largest overseas trading partner. WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra, at 13.
In a recent hearing before a Joint Senate Economic Committee (J.E.C.) witnesses uniformly
agreed that totally unrestricted trade between the United States and Japan would be of
enormous benefit to both countries. JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE, JAPAN INSIGHT, No. 27, at
4-5 (July 17, 1981).
28. WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra note 25, at iii. Combined United States-Japan GNP
accounts for over 30% of the world's gross product. Shimanouchi, Japanese Foreign Policy
and the United States: The Economic Scene, 27 JAPAN REPORT, No. 6-7, June-July 1981, at 3.
29. For example, the United States' trade policy toward Japan in recent years has
resulted in the occasional use of trade restrictive practices, such as the imposition of controls
on textile imports pursuant to a United States initiated multi-national fabric agreement, and
the restriction of imports of television sets through an orderly marketing agreement. In both
these instances, European countries followed the United States' lead and called for self-
restraint in the export of specific Japanese products, thereby achieving substantial import
restrictions. K. TANABE, NON TARIFF BARRIERS BEING DISMANTLED IN JAPAN 6 (1980). More
recently when the Japanese government announced an orderly marketing agreement on
automobile exports to the United States, both the Canadian government and the European
Economic Community followed suit in requesting similar self-restraints by Japan. JAPAN
ECONOMIC INSTITUTE, JAPAN INSIGHT, No. 19, at 3-4 (May 15, 1981).
30. As mentioned earlier, the United States and Japan have benefitted considerably
from the free trade system advocated by the GATT. See notes 26 & 27, supra. Both
economies also exert a substantial influence in the international marketplace covered by the
GATT. Together, their gross national products comprise 35% of the world's gross product
and represent almost 20% of world trade. WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 105. One
free trade advocate states that the GATT system's resistence to deterioration in the 1970's was
the result of the recognition by all the major trading nations, particularly the United States,
Japan and the EEC that economic interdependence has reached a point where any provoca-
tion of protectionist measure by one country could set off a chain reaction that might lead to
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Over the last few years, the single issue of the United States'
trade deficit to Japan has obscured the importance of this multiplex
United States-Japan relationship. 31 In reaction to the trade deficit,
there has been a tendency to seek short term ad hoe solutions at the
sacrifice of long term mutual interests. 32  The Government Pro-
worldwide depression as in the 1930's. Dunkel, supra note 25, at 5. See also Strauss, supra
note 2, at 1259. This belief that economic health is linked to the maintenance of free trade,
however, has not prevented the upsurge in NTB protectionist measures in the last five to ten
years. A major reason for this upsurge, it is argued, "has been the reluctance of some sectors
in the long-established industrial trading countries to accept as equal partners the newcomers
on the world trading scene." Dunkel, supra note 25, at 5-6. In addition to NTB's, it is said
that there has been an increasing move toward "organized trade": voluntary restraints,
bilateral agreements, import surveillance systems, etc. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 14,
1981, at 10, col. 1. These measures subvert the GATT's principles and the GATT's effective-
ness. By going outside the established trading rules of GATT, it is stated that organized trade
contributes "to a cumulative erosion of the authority of [these] rules, and to obscuring the
operation of the trading system as a whole." Dunkel, supra note 25, at 6. The decade of the
1980's has been compared to the 1930's in terms of international economic stagnation. See
Shimanouchi, supra note 28, at 3; Dunkel, supra note 25, at 5. In this context, the United
States and Japan could either acquiesce to the continued subversion of the GATT system, or
take positive steps toward the strengthening of the GATT by maintaining free trade princi-
ples, by opposing protectionist measures and by taking the initiative in reassessing and
improving the GATT's mechanisms in dealing with multilateral trade issues. Id. For a
discussion on the GATT's dispute mechanism, see generally R. HuDEc, supra note 26.
31. One study notes that the "singular and simplistic" focus by the United States on the
United States-Japan bilateral merchandise trade imbalance is unrealistic and politically
divisive. WISE MEN'S REPoRT, supra note 25, at 16. See also note 32 infra. The report points
out that a nation's world current account for merchandise, goods and services and capital is a
more realistic indication of a nation's overall economic performance. For example, despite
the approximately $10 billion imbalance in merchandise between the United States and
Japan in 1980, the United States had a global current account surplus, while Japan had a $13
to $15 billion deficit. Id. at 17. The report states that structural differences between the
Japanese and United States economies are an important source of the merchandise im-
balance. Japan is higly dependent on imported oil and must pay for such imports by
exporting manufactured goods. The United States is the world's largest market for manufac-
tured goods and does not export oil. Consequently, even if Japan's market was completely
open to United States merchandise, a large bilateral merchandise imbalance might still exist.
Id. at 19-20. The study sets forth the following "[b]etter criteria for evaluating whether or
not a country's behavior is beneficial to the operation of the international economic system":
(1) its macroeconomic policies are stable and predictable; (2) market tactics and
strategies of its companies do not involve dumping, subsidies, collusion, or other
unfair activities or disruptive injury to trading partners; (3) access to its market for
foreign goods, services, and assets is promoted on a reciprocal basis with trading
partners; (4) its exchange rate policy is not manipulated to promote exports and
reduce imports; and (5) its trade policy responses to domestic dislocation caused by
international competition stress positive measures of structural adjustment assist-
ance and worker retraining rather than protectionist measures.
id. at 18.
32. The trade deficit between the United States and Japan has become a highly politi-
cized issue, i.e., given considerable media attention, often commented on by politicians, and
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curement Code provides an opportunity for the United States and
Japan to examine critically their trade relationship with a view
toward improving bilateral relations 33 and promoting fair and open
trade in the international market place.
3 4
commonly the object of lobbying efforts. This is to be expected, given the magnitude of the
trade flow between the two countries, the visibility of the merchandise involved and the
rapidity in which certain industrial sectors have lost their competitive edge. The emphasis on
the bilateral trade imbalance, however, also serves to reinforce and heighten certain stereo-
types, namely that the United States is declining in economic strength and that "Japan Inc."
is not playing by the rules of international trade. These stereotypes "strengthen the sense of
righteousness by each country's publics and often governmental leaders in their country's
position on trade issues, reducing the room for quiet, negotiated compromise and increasing
the chances of polarization of national attitudes and politicization." WISE MEN'S REPORT,
supra note 25, at 97. Under such circumstances it becomes difficult to negotiate constructive
approaches to United States-Japan long-term interests such as the liberalization of trade,
energy alternatives to OPEC, the coordination of fiscal and macroeconomic policies, the
clarification of the United States' strategic, political and economic role in East Asia, and the
more equitable sharing of costs incurred by mutual security requirements. See U.S. TRADE
RoLE, supra note 26, at 387. For further discussion of United States-Japan political-economic
relations, see WISE MEN'S REPoRT, supra, at 96-103; U.S. TRADE RoLE, supra note 26, at
386-402.
33. One report notes that the increasing interdependence in trade between the United
States and Japan will continue to generate economic conflicts. WISE MEN's REPoRT, supra
note 25, at 22. These conflicts are inevitable when there is a massive volume of trade and a
constant shifting of relative industrial competitiveness, see id. at 23, e.g., the automobile
industry in the United States, and the aluminum ingot industry in Japan. See JAPAN EcoN.
INsTrrTE REPORT, No.17, May 1, 1981 (automobile dispute); N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1981, at
35, col. I (aluminium dispute). The Government Procurement Code will open up formerly
protected markets in Japan and the United States to foreign competition. It is likely that
certain industrial sectors will be hurt. For example, many small companies who have relied
on NTT for most of their business may now be displaced by United States firms. See IRJ,
supra note 10, at 85. United States industries may also be hurt. See Goldstein, Doing Business
Under the Agreement on Government Procurement: The Telecommunications Business-A
Case in Point, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 63, 86 (1980). In addition, there is no way to predict
whether the Code actually will make any appreciable dent in the United States-Japan trade
deficit. See NTT Hearing, supra note 4, at 50-51 (statement of Robert Cassidy). In this
context, it is important that both countries be sensitive to the adjustments which will have to
be made in order to resolve trade problems in ways which encourage competition and
cooperation rather than conflict and isolation. WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 22-23.
One way to do this is for government to create the environment for business to make such
adjustments. For example, to alleviate the trade deficit problem, the United States govern-
ment could provide assistance to United States businesses to become more competitive
abroad. Assistance could be provided by, inter alia, tax and research and development
incentives, providing information of foreign markets, credit assistance, etc. See Friedman &
Pucik, Obstacles to U.S. Exports to Japan-Not Insurmountable, Nihon Keizai Shimbun,
Apr. 7, 1981, at 20, col. 1. Another way is to establish bilateral consultation groups where
serious and objective discussions can take place, for example, the Japan-United States Eco-
nomic Relations Group (Wise Men's Group), The Task Force on United States-Japan Trade
of the House Ways and Means Committee, The Trade Study Group, The United States-Japan
Economic Council and the Advisory Council on United States-Japan Economic Relations.
See WISE MEN's REPORT, supra note 25, at iii, 100, 67-68.
34. See notes 26-27 & 30 supra.
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This Note examines the Government Procurement Code and
its impact on United States-Japan trade relations. It begins with a
summary of discriminatory procurement practices previously per-
mitted by the United States and Japan, followed by a brief history
of the Code. The Note then addresses the Code's operative mecha-
nisms and its effect on United States and Japanese procurement
practices. Finally, it considers the NTT Agreement as an illustra-
tion of the Code's potential for opening the Japanese market to
foreign suppliers.
I. UNITED STATES AND JAPANESE DISCRIMINATORY
PROCUREMENT PRACTICES PRIOR TO THE CODE
It is an ostensible goal of all governments to maximize their
efficient use of public moneys. 35  A variety of provincial concerns,
however, have led most nations to withdraw their government
purchases from the international market place, leaving competition
largely to domestic suppliers. 3  The methods used to promote
discriminatory procurement practices include: laws which restrict
government purchasing from non-domestic sources; 37 the granting
of broad discretionary powers in procurement officers to ignore
foreign bids; 3 limited publicity on procurement opportunities; 39
35. MTN STUDY, supra note 7, at 202-03. See also note 8 supra.
36. MTN STUDY, supra note 7, at 202-03. There are several factors that account for
domestic preferences in government procurement: a natural bias to favor familiar suppliers
for political economic and cultural reasons; political pressure from special interest groups;
balance of payment deficits; close relationships between government and business; practical
factors such as lack of uniformity in product specifications; language barriers; accessibility of
service, maintenance, and repair parts when dealing with a domestic companies; the greater
facility to legal recourse in case of default; and national security reasons. See TAA of 1979,
supra note 3, at 321; Marks and Malmgren, supra note 3, at 403-04. International trade is
substantially restricted by buy-national policies. Each government is its nation's largest single
consumer, and it has been estimated that 25-40% of the GNP of most nations is passed
through their public budgets. Allison, The Nontariff Trade Barrier Challenge: Development
and Distortion in the Age of Interdependence, 12 TULsA L.J. 1, 12 n.43 (1976).
37. The United States' Buy American Act is one such example. 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d
(1976). See also notes 53-58 infra and accompanying text.
38. This form of discrimination may be the most effective because it provides no record
or trace of authorization on which to base a complaint. See K. DAM, supra note 3, at 204. The
Japanese government uses this broad discretion in the form of "administrative guidance." See
note 113 infra and accompanying text.
39. Failure to provide adequate information concerning bidding opportunities is one of
the simplest methods of procurement discrimination. Publication may be limited so that only
a few firms find out about a government purchasing opportunity. Furthermore, the informa-
tion contained in the publication may be insufficient to make intelligent bids. This tends to
favor domestic suppliers with long established ties to government procurement agencies. See
R. BALDWIN, supra note 2, at 61-62.
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selective tendering, where a selective group of suppliers is invited to
bid; 40 and single tendering, where only one source is contacted to
bid.41
Both the United States and Japan have shown preference to
their domestic suppliers in government procurement. 42  The man-
ner of treatment, however, has differed drastically.4 3  In contrast
to the direct, legally endorsed discriminatory government procure-
ment procedures in the United States,44 preferential purchasing in
Japan has been tacit and often present in the form of administrative
practices.45
A. United States Procurement Practices
1. Authority
The most conspicuous form of American discrimination
against foreign exporters has been the Buy American Act of 1933,46
40. Selective tendering is when only a limited number of suppliers, usually from pre-
established lists, are solicited to compete for government tenders. Because inscription on such
lists is largely discretionary in many countries, procurement officials may easily exclude
foreign suppliers. See Note, Eliminating Nontariff Barriers to International Trade: The MTN
Agreement on Government Procurement, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 315, 326-27 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Eliminating NTBs]; R. BALDWIN, supra note 2, at 59-61.
41. Single tender allows no competition and is highly discretionary. Because single
tender is often used in research and development-type procurement which requires close
government supervision, domestic firms with long established relationships to government
agencies are often given preference over foreign firms. See R. BALDWIN, supra note 2, at 61.
42. See notes 46-113 infra and accompanying text,.
43. See W. CLINE, N. KAWANABE, T. KRONSJ6 & T. WILLIAMS, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN
THE TOKYO ROUND 190 (1978) [hereinafter cited as W. CLINE].
44. An underlying principle of United States government procurement is open competi-
tion. Anthony & Hagerty, Cautious Optimism As a Guide to Foreign Government Procure-
ment, 11 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1301, 1309 (1979). For example, if contract specifications are
so restrictive as to preclude open competition, the Comptroller General may cancel the
contract. Goldstein, supra note 33, at 68 n.34. Thus the procurement process in the United
States is highly visible-the solicitation of bids and contract specifications are openly adver-
tised, awards published, and bid protests followed by published decisions. Anthony &
Hagerty, supra.
45. Open competition has not been an underlying principle governing the procurement
process in Japan. See Eliminating NTBs, supra note 38, at 332-33; Anthony & Hagerty, supra
note 44, at 1308-09.
46. 41 U.S.C. §§ lOa-10d (1976). The Act provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and unless the head of the depart-
ment or independent establishment concerned shall determine it to be inconsistent
with the public interest, or the cost to be unreasonable, only such unmanufactured
articles, materials, and supplies as have been mined or produced in the United
States, and only such manufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have been
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which directs the federal government to give a six percent 47 price
preference for goods of domestic origin. 48  Under certain circum-
stances, the Act permits this six percent preference to be modified
or waived. 4  The margin of preference is twelve percent if the
United States firm is a small business50 or located in a designated
area of unemployment. 5' The Defense Department currently
grants a fifty percent differential for balance of payment reasons. 5
The Buy American Act, however, is not the only barrier pre-
venting procurement from abroad.5 3 A host of statutes and admin-
istrative procedures also restricts United States procurement from
manufactured in the United States substantially all from articles, materials, or
supplies mined, produced, or manufactured, as the case may be, in the United
States, shall be acquired for public use. This section shall not apply with respect to
articles, materials, or supplies for use outside the United States, or if articles,
materials, or supplies of the class or kind to be used or the articles, materials, or
supplies from which they are manufactured are not mined, produced, or manufac-
tured, as the case may be, in the United States in sufficient and reasonably available
commercial quantities and of a satisfactory quality.
Id. § 10a. A complete analysis of the Buy American Act is beyond the scope of this Note. For
a thorough review of the Act, see generally Chierichella, The Buy American Act and the Use
of Foreign Sources in Federal Procurements-An Issues Analysis, 9 PUB. CONT. L.J. 73
(1977); Gantt & Speck, Domestic V. Foreign Trade Problems in Federal Government Con-
tracting: Buy American Act and Executive Order, 7 J. PUB. L. 378 (1958); Knapp, The Buy
American Act: A Review and Assessment, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1961); Trainor, The Buy
American Act: Examination, Analysis and Comparison, 64 Mil. L.Rev. 101 (1974).
47. Exec. Order No. 10,582, § 2, 19 Fed. Reg. 8,723 (1954), [hereinafter cited as E.O.
10,582]. This six percent differential may alternatively be raised to ten percent if duty and
costs incurred in the United States are deducted from the foreign bid price. Id.
48. A "fifty percent test" is used to determine domestic origin. Materials are considered
to be of domestic origin if the cost of foreign products used in such materials constitutes less
than fifty percent of all such materials. E.O. 10,582, id., § 2(a). See Chierichella, supra note
46, at 78-81.
49. E.O. 10,582, supra note 50, §§ 3, 5. See Trainor, supra note 46, at 117-20.
50. A small business concern is defined generally as an independently owned and
operated business which is not dominant in its field of operation. For the definition of a small
business concern, see 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.701-1 (1976), E.O. 10,582 § 3(b). For the current law
on small business and minority business set aside programs, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-647 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979), 22 U.S.C. § 2352, 41 U.S.C. § 252(b) (1976).
51. A labor surplus area is generally defined as an area which is designated by the
Secretary of Labor as containing six percent or more of the labor force unemployed. For the
definition of a labor surplus area concern, see 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.801 (1976). For the current
laws on programs for areas of substantial unemployment, see Defense Manpower Policy No.
4A, 32A, C.F.R. Part 134 (1979).
52. 32 C.F.R. § 6-104.4 (1979).
53. For a list of the United States laws and regulations potentially affected by the Code,
see MTN Study, supra note 7, at 233-37.
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foreign suppliers.5 4 For example, the General Services Administra-
tion Appropriations Act provides a fifty percent differential for
purchases of hand tools. 55  Foreign procurement of clothing, food
and certain other items is prohibited pursuant to the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act.56  Small business and minority "set-
aside" programs and laws exclude foreign suppliers by requiring
that a "fair" proportion of total government purchases be set aside
for such purposes.5 7  In addition, many states and municipalities
have purchasing rules that openly discriminate against foreigners.5 8
2. Practices and Procedures
Government purchasing in the United States is based in princi-
ple on open competition," and is highly "visible" or "transpar-
ent."' 0 Easily identifiable statutes, regulations and published
agency directives to procurement personnel overwhelmingly govern
the procurement process."' Purchasing is generally carried out by
the General Services Administration for civilian goods, by the De-
partment of Defense for military items, and by individual agencies
for those purchases which are peculiar to their own needs. 2 The
54. The Buy American Act is not the primary barrier to procurement from abroad. This
is because the price differentials of the Act only go into effect if there is competition between
foreign and domestic suppliers. Other discriminatory restrictions such as national security,
specific legislation and practical considerations often prevent foreign competition from ever
reaching the point where the Buy American Act would be used. See Anthony & Hagerty,
supra note 44, at 1305 n.21.
55. Act of Aug. 9, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-91, § 505, 89 Stat. 441. 41 C.F.R. § 5A-6.104-
50 (1979).
56. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 94-212, §§ 709, 723, 729,
90 Stat. 153 (1976).
57. See, e.g., Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 631-47 (1976), as amended by Act of
Oct. 24, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-507, tit. II, 92 Stat. 1761.
58. For a list of these state practices, see Eliminating NTBs, supra note 38, at 321 n.35.
While these state "Buy-National" statutes have been criticized for interfering with federal
policy, see, e.g., Note, State Buy-American Laws-Invalidity of State Attempts to Favor
American Producers, 64 MINN. L. REv. 389 (1980), under the Code such entities have been
expressly excluded. GPA, supra note 7, art. I, para. 2. See also MTN STUDY, supra note 7, at
224-25.
59. Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 44, at 1309.
60. See MTN STUDY, supra note 7, at 233. See also S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1, 128, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 381, 514-15 [hereinafter cited
as S. REP. NO. 249].
61. Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 44, at 1309. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 60, at
514-15.
62. [1972] Gov'T CONT. GUIDE (CCH) 11.
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Commerce Business Daily publishes all United States government
procurement invitations and contract awards for civilian procure-
ment actions of $5,000 or moretI 3 and for military purchases of
greater than $10,000.64
Broadly speaking, federal procurement can be divided into
two categories, advertised procurement and negotiated procure-
ment. 5 Advertised procurement, the United States' preferred
form of procurement, is a highly formalized procedure mandated
by statutes and regulations.66 Generally, bids are solicited from as
many qualified sources of supplies or services as are deemed neces-
sary to assure full and free competition.6 7 With a few exceptions,
the government must advertise for bids when costs are predictable,
specifications are readily obtainable, and adequate time and quali-
fied suppliers are available.6 8 In contrast to formal advertising,
negotiated procurement is a flexible process by which the govern-
ment solicits proposals or quotations with the provision that it may
hold discussions to allow a modification of the proposals or quota-
tions.6" The form of the contractual arrangement, the product
specifications and the criteria for awarding the contract need not be
exact and may be negotiated until the time of award. 70  Generally,
however, no procurement will be made by negotiation if formal
advertising is practicable under the circumstances. 71
Negotiated procurement is permitted only under statutory ex-
emptions72 such as non-military purchases of under $10,00073 or
when only one supplier exists.7 4  Competition is encouraged to the
maximum practical extent, 75 and any supplier who alleges unfair
63. See id.; 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-2.203-4, 1-1.1003. (1976).
64. See GOV'T CONT. GUIDE, supra note 62, at 11.
65. BASIC TECHNIQUES OF PUBLIC CONTRACrS PRACTICE 3-52 (W. Huffcut & M. Haiken
eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as PUBLIC CONTAars].
66. See generally 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1976). Advertised public procurement is the most
important non-defense solicitation procedure in the United States. In 1965, 77 % of the value
of all General Service Administration contracts were of this type. R. BALDWIN, supra note 2,
at 60.
67. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.102 (1976).
68. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304-2305 (1976) (military purchases); 41 U.S.C. §§ 5, 252-253
(1976) (civilian purchases).
69. PUBLIC CONTRACs, supra note 65, at 36.
70. Id. at 37-38.
71. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.101 (1976).
72. See 41 C.F.R. § 1-3.200 (1976).
73. Id. § 1-3.203.
74. Id. § 1-3.210.
75. Id. § 1-3.101(d).
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exclusion from a proposed purchase may promptly file a protest
requesting a determination on the merits.7"
Except in the area of defense,7 7 the foreign procurement dis-
crimination by the Buy American Act and other statutory and
administrative provisions is relatively mild when contrasted with
procedures used by other governments. 78  Furthermore, the com-
paratively visible legislative authority and procurement procedures
of the United States, with their underlying principle of competi-
tion, serve to discourage discretionary, administrative discrimina-
tion against foreign suppliers .7  As a result, the United States has
consistently been a major proponent of a comprehensive interna-
tional agreement on government procurement.80
B. Japanese Procurement Practices
1. Authority
During the late 1950's and early 1960's, Japan experienced a
period of unprecedented growth.8 This rapid development was in
part attributable to the Japanese government's policy of "prohibi-
tion in principle" toward foreign imports and investments.8 2  In
76. See PUBLIC CONTRACTS, supra note 65, at 312-14.
77. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
78. Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 44, at 1305. One commentator states that the
Japanese and European telecommunications markets were virtually closed to United States
telecommunications products before the implementation of the Code. (Under the Code,
European public Postal Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) entities are still closed, but telecom-
munications equipment can be purchased by non-PTT entities.) With government controlled
foreign telecommunications markets closed to United States exports, American firms were
disadvantaged by not being able to maintain the economies of scale to plough back research
and development monies necessary to remain competitive. Inversely, foreign entities such as
NTT were able to reap high profits from protected home markets to compete successfully
abroad. In the United States' immense telecommunications market, it is stated that the
Buy-American Act's six percent differential has provided a meaningful edge for United States
suppliers of central office and other switching equipment. See Goldstein, supra note 33, at
85-87.
79. For example, it is a regular procedure in the United States to allow bid protests to be
heard by the General Accounting Office (GAO). After the hearing a decision will be pub-
lished. Such built-in grievance procedures serve to deter discriminatory practices. See An-
thony & Hagerty, supra note 44, at 1309.
80. See Pomeranz, supra note 15, at 1270-79. See also MTN STUDY, supra note 7, at
201-217; Marks & Malmgren, supra note 3, at 401-04.
81. Between 1955 and 1969, Japan's average annual rate of growth exceeded 10%. H.
FUKUDA, JAPAN AND WORLD TRADE: THE YEARS AHEAD 26 (1973). See also How THE UNITED
STATES AND JAPAN SEE EACH OTHER'S ECONOMY (I. Frank & R. Hirono eds.) 9-36 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as ECONOMY].
82. These controls were instituted during the reconstruction phase following World
War II for balance-of payments reasons and to protect infant industries. THE U.S.-JAPAN
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1963 a cabinet order was issued requiring government agencies to
purchase certain products from domestic producers in preference to
foreign suppliers.83 The decree was designed to aid domestic in-
dustry and to impede the outflow of hard currency.8 4
Responding to representations by other industrial nations that
its trade restrictions were inconsistent with its economic strength,8 5
Japan began gradually to relax its protective barriers in the 1960's
and 1970's.86 In 1972, the Finance Ministry abolished the cabinet
order for products in fourteen commodity groups.817  Only com-
puters and related software items remained on the list. Finally, in
1975, they too were removed.88 Further commitments by Japan to
liberalize government procurement developed from discussions pur-
suant to the Tokyo Declaration in 197389 and from participation in
the MTN.90 By December 1977, the Japanese government had
embarked upon an "Eight-Point External Economic Measures" pro-
gram, which included in one of its points "participation by foreign
corporations in the public bidding for government purchase or-
ders." 9 1
TRADE COUNCIL, JAPANESE EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS OF "IMPORT-PULL" AND
"ExPoRT PUSH" FACTORS 27 (1978). See Weil and Glick, supra note 12, at 854-56. See also
ECONOMY, supra note 81, at 42-44; WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 56. For an
historical background of Japanese trade and investment restrictions, see generally W. LocK-
WOOD, THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF JAPAN (expanded ed. 1968).
83. Cabinet Order No. 336 of September 25, 1963. See J.W. MARLOW, STATUTES,
REGULATIONS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES OF SELECTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES PROVIDING FOR PREF-
EBENCES FOR DOMESTIC MATERIALS AND FIRMS IN THE AWARDING OF PUBLIC SUPPLY AND
PUBLIC WORKS CONTRACTS 41 (1965), reprinted in 111 CONG. REC. 9706 (1965).
84. Eliminating NTBs, supra note 38, at 332.
85. See Weil & Glick, supra note 12, at 857. From 1955 to 1972 Japan's share of total
world exports more than tripled from 2.1% to 7.1%. Japan's percentage of world imports
increased at a slower rate, from 2.5 % to 5.6 % during the same period. ECONOMY, supra note
81, at 35.
86. Weil & Glick, supra note 12, at 856-61. For a discussion of the laws and policies
relating to foreign business entry into Japan during this libera[liza]tion phase, see generally
D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN (1973).
87. J. W. Marlow, supra note 83, at 41, 111 CONG. REC. at 9706.
88. Id. at 42, 111 CONG. REC. at 9706.
89. See note 3 supra.
90. JAPAN EXTERNAL TRADE ORGANIZATION (JETRO), OVERSEAS PUBLIC RELATIONS DE-
PARTMENT, THE IMPORT SYSTEM OF JAPAN-ExPORTERS GUIDE 1 (1978).
91. Id. at 2. This resulted in a cabinet decision on January 13, 1978, to encourage
foreign sales to government entities such as NTT, the Kokusai Denshlin Denwa (KDD) (the
Japanese government's international telecommunications carrier), the Nippon Hoso Kyokai
(NHK) (the government broadcasting station), the Defense Agency, the National Space
Development Agency and local and municipal governments. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
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Japan has not had a formal "buy-national" scheme similar to
the Buy American Act.92  Nor does it presently have any legislation
giving preference to domestic suppliers. 93  Rather, discriminatory
purchasing has appeared in other forms.
2. Practices and Procedures
A major source of foreign discrimination in government pur-
chasing in Japan stems from the procurement system. Although
regulations establish guidelines for public purchasing, the Japanese
government has no central procurement office. Instead, a unit of
each ministry or agency has been assigned to handle purchasing.9 4
There has also been no centralized system for publicizing procure-
ment notices. 5 This decentralized procurement system has given
each agency a wide latitude to establish purchasing procedures. 9
There are three types of Japanese government procurement:
public notice procurement, selective tender procurement and nego-
tiated private procurement. 97  Under public notice procurement,
COMMERCE, INDUSTRY AND TRADE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. EXPORT OPPORTUNITIFS TO JAPAN 261
(1978) [hereinafter cited as U.S. ExPoRT OPPORTUNITIES]. The basic guidelines of the decision
are as follows:
(1) To endeavor to achieve greater recourse to competitive tendering. (2) To seek to
improve the dissemination of information. (3) To give due consideration to the
period for receiving bids, in order to make it possible for more to participate in
tendering. (4) To endeavor to improve operational procedures with regard to other
matters concerning the entering of bids.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, 100 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON JAPAN'S ECONOMY
AND JAPAN-U.S. TRADE 13 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 100 Questions]. On April 1, 1978, a
directive was issued by the Ministry of Finance to implement these guidelines. Id.
92. H. FUKUDA, supra note 81, at 90; Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 44, at 1308.
93. 100 QUESTIONS, supra note 91, at 13; W. CLINE, supra note 43, at 190.
94. U.S. EXPORT OPPORTUNITES, supra note 91, at 346.
95. Id. Without a centralized system of publicizing, domestic firms which have an
ongoing relationship with government procurement offices are at an advantage. A foreign
supplier who does not have a functional understanding of the procurement system may not
be able to find out about procurement opportunities, or about how to participate in the
procurement process once these opportunities are known.
96. In both the United States and Japan, potential bidders are first screened in order to
prevent unreliable or irresponsible firms from participating in the tendering process. See,
e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.310 (1976) (U.S.); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, OVER-
SEAS BUSINESS REPORTS, MARKETING IN JAPAN 11 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MARKETING IN
JAPAN] (JAPAN). For nonmilitary contracts United States procurement "screening" is con-
ducted under 41 U.S.C. § 5 (1976). Procurement regulation 41 C.F.R. § 1-1.310 (1976) sets
forth the criteria that a contracting officer must follow in determining a responsible contrac-
tor. In Japan the criteria for screening is largely left to individual agencies to determine.
MARKETING IN JAPAN, supra.
97. MARKETING IN JAPAN, supra note 96, at 11.
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all registered firms are eligible- to submit bids on a competitive
basis. Announcement of such requests should contain pertinent
information concerning the item to be tendered,"8 and must be
posted at least ten days prior to the closing of bids.99 This is often
barely sufficient time to study the specifications and prepare a bid,
especially if the firm is unfamiliar with the procedures. 00 Publi-
cizing of public notice procurement, however, has generally been
given limited circulation because there has been no requirement for
publication in the government's official gazette the Kampo or in
newspapers. 01 Foreign firms without access to such information
may be effectively excluded from procurement participation. 02
Under the selective tender system, bids are solicited from a list
of selected suppliers. 0 3  This list is usually drawn up by each
purchasing agency from its records of registered firms. 0 4  Selective
tender may be used when the purchasing agency determines that
just a few suppliers are interested, public notice is disadvantageous
under the circumstances, or the value of purchasing is below a
certain monetary level.10 5  In Japan, selective tender has been the
most prevalent method of government purchasing. 06 Since the
criteria for establishing a list of suppliers are largely discretionary,
this method of procurement has been criticized for excluding for-
eign competition as well as other domestic suppliers. 0 7
98. Announcements must contain: information on the object of the tenders, qualifica-
tions for bidders, location from which to make inquiries about bid specifications, time and
place at which there will be opening of bids, and matters concerning required financial
guarantees. Id.
99. Id. In contrast, the United States establishes a 15 day minimum for standard
commercial articles, and a 30 day minimum for non-standard items. 41 C.F.R. § 1-2.202-1
(1976).
100. U.S. ExPoRT OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 91, at 347.
101. Id. The official gazette is called the Kampo.
102. Eliminating NTBs, supra note 38, at 327.
103. U.S. ExPoRT OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 91, at 347.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Eliminating NTBs, supra note 38, at 332.
107. "Families" of firms with long established ties with government agencies are often
the only firms on these lists. This means that other Japanese suppliers are excluded from
bidding, and foreign firms resorted to only if goods or services are not available domestically.
H. FUKUDA, supra note 81, at 90-91; Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 44, at 1309. For
example, NTT has until recently maintained closed dealings with the "Den Den Family," a
select group of Japanese manufacturers who receive the bulk of NTT's contracts. Because of
this procurement practice of excluding foreigners, NTT had been criticized for "incubating"
its domestic suppliers-allowing them to develop new technology in a closed market, espe-
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Negotiated private procurement transactions involve either se-
lected suppliers or a single supplier. 108 Such procurement may be
used when the nature and objectives of the contract do not allow
competition, or when competition is deemed disadvantageous. The
purchasing agency may also use negotiated private procurement
when the circumstances call for urgency or when the cost of the
procurement is less than a certain monetary value.'09 A substantial
percentage of goods and services procured by Japan's central gov-
ernment entities has been secured by negotiated direct procure-
ment." 0 This method allows the most discretion in extending an
offer to potential bidders and thus affords the fullest opportunity to
favor domestic suppliers."'
Japan's government procurement practices and procedures
have resulted in the unintentional, systemic exclusion of foreign
competition. Logistical obstruction of foreign entry can be found in
the decentralized procurement system, nominal publicity require-
ments, the short period in which to respond to government procure-
ment proposals, and the lack of open bidding. This system perpetu-
ates an inherent bias in favor of domestic suppliers." 2  To some
degree, Japan's exclusion of foreign suppliers has also been a matter
cially semi-conductor, computer and telecommunications equipment and thus moving them
into the position of becoming major competitors abroad. See U.S.-JAPAN TRADE REPORT,
supra note 12, at 26. NTT is already a major exporter of telecommunications in Southeast
Asia and has begun to expand its markets to Central and South America. See Nihon Keizai
Shimbun, May 5, 1981, at 9, col 3.
108. MARKETING IN JAPAN, supra note 96, at 11-12.
109. Id.
110. U.S. ExPORT OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 91, at 347.
111. Eliminating NTBs, supra note 38, at 327.
112. H. FUKUDA, supra note 81, at 90. "[T]echnological standards and specifications
unique to Japan" have also been cited as a barrier to competition by foreign firms. Eliminat-
ing NTBs, supra note 38, at 332-33. Another problem has been product testing. The testing of
electrical eqiupment, for instance, must be conducted in Japan. WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra
note 25, at 59-60. Even if product standards and tests are met, traditional business and
cultural factors create unique problems in penetrating the Japanese market. The difficulty of
translating documents from, and into, Japanese, is often cited as a factor which puts foreign
firms, especially small firms, at a disadvantage. Eliminating NTBs, supra note 38, at 332-33.
Of course, as a matter of reciprocity, the United States does not publish its procurement
notices in Japanese. The complex distribution system held together by a long-established
network of personal relationships, has also been a major barrier to foreign business entry into
Japan. See WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 63-64. A discussion of the problems of
commercial entry into Japan is beyond the scope of this Note. For a more extensive review of
these issues, see generally U.S. EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES, supra note 91; Weil & Glick, supra
note 12; and WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra note 25.
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of choice. Either under "administrative guidance"1 3 or because of
personal nationalistic, nepotistic or complacent tendencies, pro-
curement officials have exercised their discretion to prevent foreign
access in government procurement.
II. THE CODE
The MTN Agreement on Government Procurement" 4 pro-
poses to reduce or eliminate trade protections created by preferen-
tial government procurement policies."- Two levels of provisions
in the Code are designed to accomplish this goal. First, the signato-
ries have expressly agreed upon the basic principle of non-discrimi-
113. [Administrative guidance] is a method used by the Japanese government to
achieve certain policy objectives. It reflects, in part, the Japanese penchant for
avoiding confrontation by using informal channels to deal with problems, and
provides the government with a flexible technique for maintaining "harmony" in
the economy through the use of temporary measures that avoid the need for
legislative action. Trade barriers accomplished through the use of administrative
guidance are therefore considerably more subtle than overt product approval stand-
ards [or] government procurement . . . . (citations omitted).
Weil & Glick, supra note 12, at 889.
114. The creation of an international agreement on government procurement was
sparked in 1962 by complaints raised by representatives of Belgium and the United Kingdom
before the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) regarding the
United States government's use of the Buy American Act. The investigation of the dispute
first resulted in a Working Party report on government procurement in the United States.
Pomeranz, supra note 15, at 1271. When the report was being subsequently reviewed by the
OECD Trade Committee, the United States shifted the emphasis of the investigation to all of
the member countries. Id. at 1272. There resulted a study published in 1966 which was
ultimately integrated into the MTN Government Procurement Code. MTN STUDY, supra
note 7, at 208 n.3.
115. GPA, supra note 7. The Code consists of a preamble followed by nine articles and
four annexes. Paragraph seven of the Code's preamble states "that laws, regulations, proce-
dures and practices regarding government procurement should not be prepared, adopted or
applied to foreign or domestic products and to foreign or domestic suppliers so as to afford
protection to domestic products or suppliers and should not discriminate among foreign
products or suppliers." GPA, supra note 7, preamble. Discrimination in government procure-
ment is the result of both deliberate efforts to favor domestic suppliers, and ignorance and
complacency on the part of government officials who are unwilling to spend the time and
take the risks of purchasing from foreign suppliers, Thus it is important that an international
code on government procurement set forth administrative procedures which expose to public
scrutiny the various stages of the procurement process and allow for bid protests to be heard,
i.e., full publicizing of procurement opportunities and specifications, disclosure of informa-
tion as to why bids were rejected and access to a dispute mechanism. R. BALDWIN, THE
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONs-ToWARD GREATER LIBERALIZATION? 16 (1979). See also
note 8 supra for a discussion of the economic theory behind the Code.
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nation."'  Second, they have provided for specific guidelines to
ensure that discrimination will in fact be eliminated." 7
A. Scope
The Government Procurement Code is limited to procurement
entities" 8 "under the direct or substantial control""" of the signa-
tory governments, and applies only to purchases of products. 20
Service contracts per se are exempt.' 2' This does not exclude,
however, services that are "incidental to the supply of prod-
ucts."12 2 Government purchases below a minimum contract value
of 150,000 special drawing rights (SDRs) 2 3 are also excluded. 12 4
116. Under Article II's "National Treatment and Non-Discrimination" requirements
"all laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government procurement covered
by this Agreement" must "immediately and unconditionally" accord foreign products and
suppliers treatment no less favorable than that granted to domestic products and suppliers.
Furthermore, no foreign products or suppliers may be accorded treatment more favorable
than that given to any other foreign products or suppliers. GPA, supra note 7, art. II. This
requirement of national treatment and non-discrimination applies to "products originating
within the customs territories (including free [trade] zones)" of the signatory countries to the
Code. Id. para. 1. Each country should apply its own rules of origin as applied in the normal
course of trade. Id. para. 3. This non-uniform application may present problems in the
future. See Brown, supra note 3, at 200-01. A country with strict rules of origin may be
disadvantaged because non-signatories to the Code may be able to conceal product origin by
transhipment through signatory countries. This means that a "strict-rule-of-origin" country
may have to compete with non-signatories for procurement opportunities made available in
other signatory countries. See MTN STuDY, supra note 7, at 259.
One major exception to the conditional most-favored nation (MFN) treatment of the
Code is Article III, which provides for the concerns of developing countries and grants
preferential treatment on the basis of the need to safeguard balance of payments and promote
industry in key areas of economic development. CPA, supra note 7, art. III.
117. TAA of 1979, supra note 3, at 329.
118. See discussion at note 11 supra.
119. GPA, supra note 7, art. I(c). Annex I contains the lists of each of the parties entities
which fall under the provisions of the Code. Id. Annex 1. These entity lists are an integral
part of the Code, id. art. IX, para. 10, and are subject to adjustments. Id. art. IX, para. 5.
"Entities" expressly includes agencies. Id. art. I, n.l.
120. Id. art. I(a).
121. Id. For example, construction, insurance and banking contracts. See Anthony &
Hagerty, supra note 44, at 1319-21. There is a provision in the Code which states that within
three years (from the Code's in-force date) the signatories shall undertake negotiation "at an
early stage, [to] explore the possibilities of expanding the coverage of this Agreement to
include service contracts." CPA, supra, art. IX, para. 6(b).
122. Id. art I(a). Such services are covered by the Code as long as their value does not
exceed that of the products themselves. Id. The Code does not, however, indicate when a
service is "incidential." Brown, supra note 3, at 200.
123. A "Special Drawing Right" (SDR), is a unit of international reserve assets insti-
tuted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1969. MTN STUDY, supra note 7, at 222
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Further, the Code does not apply to regional and local government
procurement, 2 5 nor does it cover contracts concerning tied aid to
developing countries. 26
There are two other areas listed as exceptions in the Code.
First, government purchases relating to arms, ammunition and war
materials are exempted for reasons of national security and national
defense.1 27  Second, good-faith procurement which affects public
morals, public order and safety, and which provides economic
encouragement to certain disadvantaged groups is also exempted. 128
B. Technical Specifications
Product specifications and standards in government procure-
ment can be used as an effective barrier to foreign suppliers if
designed simply to accommodate domestic manufacturers. 2 9  Un-
der the Code, such technical specifications shall not be prepared,
applied or adopted to create non-tariff restrictions. 30  The Code
encourages the use of uniform international standards and substi-,
tuted product equivalents.' 3'
n.l. SDR value is based on a "basket" of currencies, weighted by the percentage of world
trade of 16 major trading nations. Since the SDR floats against the dollar, its value fluctuates.
150,000 SDRs is approximately $195,000. See Brown, supra note 3, at 199 n.8.
124. GPA, supra note 7, art. I(b).
125. See Id. art. I, paras. 1(c), 2. See also note 58 supra.
126. See GPA, supra note 7, art. III. In general, the Code provides for special and
differential treatment for developing countries. Id. It is beyond the scope of this note to deal
with such issues. For a discussion of developing countries and the MTN, see G. M. Meier,
Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Developing Countries, 13 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 239 (1980).
127. GPA, supra note 7, art. VIII, para. 1.
128. Id. art. VIII, para. 2. Both the national security and public morals exceptions have
been criticized because the ambiguity of the language used leaves substantial room for
interpretation and discretion. Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 44, at 1322-23; Eliminating
NTBs, supra note 38, at 341-42.
129. Brown, supra note 3, at 201. For example, the differences of regional standards in
Europe has significantly prevented a community-wide telecommunications market in the
EEC. Goldstein, supra note 33, at 88 n.132. See also note 280 infra and accompanying text.
130. GPA, supra note 7, art. IV.
131. Id. The use of international or national standards should increase competition
since suppliers are most likely to be familiar with them. The use of substituted product
equivalents means that bid proposals should be set forth as specifications based on function
rather than form. This should encourage innovation and efficiency. MTN STUDY, supra note
7, at 299.
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C. Transparency
The Code's key function is to make government procurement
procedures more "transparent," i.e., identifiable,, open, and regu-
larly administered. 3 2 By prescribing publication and advertising
requirements, the Code seeks to eliminate discrimination practiced
by countries with no formal scheme of procurement bias. 33  For-
eign suppliers should have access to all publications regarding pro-
curement opportunities. Information necessary to acquire a func-
tional understanding of qualification, tendering and award
procedures should also be made available. 134
Under the Code, all procurement laws, regulations and proce-
dures must be promptly set forth in certain designated publica-
tions, 35  Conditions of tender qualification and notice of procure-
ment proposals also must be publicized, 36  and pertinent
information must be included. 37  Adequate time must be afforded
132. Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 44, at 1323. See also notes 60 & 61 supra and
accompanying text.
133. Prescribed transparency procedures and practices in the Code are designed to
replace "administrative guidance" and other discretionary methods currently used by govern-
ments to discriminate against foreign goods in public purchasing. See id. at 1323-24.
134. TwENTY-TnmD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM-1978, at 28.
135. GPA, supra note 7, art. VI, para. 1. The parties and entities should also be
prepared to explain, upon request, additional information about practices and procedures.
Id. Japanese laws, regulations and procedures are published in the Genko-Nihon-Hoki (com-
pilation of Current Laws and Regulations of Japan), and/or Kampo (Official Gazette).
United States laws, regulations and procedures are published in the United States Code, the
United States Code of Federal Regulations and original-source reporters. See id. Annex IV.
136. Id. art. V. Notices are published as listed in Annex II. Id. art. V, para. 3. In Japan,
publications will be in the Kampo (Official Gazette), in the United States, in the Commerce
Buisness Daily. Id. Annex II. An amended or re-issued notice of a proposal must be given the
same publication circulation as the original notice. Id. art. V, para. 8. In addition, the entity
shall publish a summary of the notices of procurement proposal in one of the official
languages of the GATT. Id. art. V, para. 4.
137. Id. art. V, para. 4. Each notice of a proposed procurement must contain:
(a) the nature and quantity of the products to be supplied, or envisaged to be
purchased in the case of contracts of a recurring nature; (b) whether the procedure
is open or selective; (c) any delivery date; (d) the address and final date for
submitting an application to be invited to tender or for qualifying for the suppliers'
lists, or for receiving tenders, as well as the language or languages in which they
must be submitted; (e) the address of the entity awarding the contract and provid-
ing any information necessary for obtaining specifications and other documents; (f)
any economic and technical requirements, financial guarantees and information
required from suppliers; (g) the amount and terms of payment of any sum payable
for the tender documentation.
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suppliers to respond to such opportunities. 138  Entities maintaining
permanent lists of qualified suppliers are required annually to pub-
lish the title and the conditions of inscription to those lists.139
In addition, any inquiry regarding the procurement process
must be given prompt attention by the purchasing entity. 140  If a
firm has failed to qualify, has not been invited or permitted to
tender, or has been unsuccessful in the award of a contract, then
the purchasing entity must supply that firm with an explanation
within a reasonable time.141
D. Tendering
The Code recognizes three tendering procedures, open tender,
selective tender, and single tender.142  Open tender is the Code's
preferred method of tendering. 143 The procedures for open tender,
however, are inflexible and can be costly and cumbersome. 144
Therefore, the Code also recognizes selective and single tendering
procedures. 145  In order to limit the discretionary application of
these tendering processes, 14 the Code has qualified the use of selec-
tive tender 147 and allows single tender in only five instances. 48
138. Id. art. V, para. 2(a). For the qualification of suppliers, the Code states that there
must be "adequate time to enable interested suppliers to initiate and, to the extent that it is
compatabile with efficient operation of the procurement process, complete the qualification
procedures." Id. For the preparation of bids in response to proposals, the Code requires a 30
day minimum preparation period, subject to reductions in a "state of urgency," or if there is a
recurring contract. Id. art. V, para. 10.
139. Id. art. V, para. 6(a). Such publications will appear as listed in Annex III. CPA,
supra note 7, Annex III.
140. Id. art. V, para. 13; art. VI, para. 2.
141. Id. art. VI, paras. 3-5.
142. For purposes of the Code, open tendering is defined as "those procedures under
which all interested suppliers may submit a tender"; selective tendering as "those procedures
under which, consistent with [the Code], those suppliers invited to do so by the entity may
submit a tender"; and single tendering as "those procedures where the entity contacts
suppliers individually, only under the conditions specified in [the Code]." Id. art. V, para. 1.
143. Open tender is preferred in the sense that it offers the greatest competition among
suppliers, and thus discourages preferential treatment in government procurement. See
Eliminating NTBs, supra note 38, at 335. Unlike selective or single tender, its use is not
limited or conditioned by the Code's provisions. See generally CPA, supra note 7, art. V.
144. See R. BALDWIN, supra note 2, at 61.
145. CPA, supra note 7, art. V. See Eliminating NTBs, supra note 38, at 335-36.
146. The use of pre-established lists to select suppliers allows purchasing officials an
opportunity to favor domestic suppliers. Eliminating NTBs, supra note 38, at 335. See note
38 supra and accompanying text.
147. These qualifications are: (1) publishing the conditions and qualifications that a
supplier must meet, CPA, supra note 7, art. V, para. 2(a); (2) considering for qualification
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E. Settlement and Enforcement
Settlement and enforcement procedures are two-tiered. First,
the Code requires that a procuring entity disclose to an unsuccessful
supplier the reasons for rejection and the relative merits of the
winning bid. 149  The unsuccessful foreign supplier is therefore able
to learn if there were possible violations of the Code. 150 By follow-
ing the Code's grievance procedures, the firm may settle directly
with the procuring entity. 151 As a result of this direct process of
interaction between the complaining supplier and the procuring
entity, the Code is rendered largely self-enforcing.152
Second, the Code contains enforcement provisions which es-
tablish a Committee on Government Procurement to oversee, mon-
itor and enforce the Code. 153 Resolution of any dispute should first
be attempted through bilateral consultations between the govern-
and tender any new suppliers, id. art. V, para. 6(c); (3) including within a reasonable time
qualified suppliers wishing to be placed on permanent lists, id. art. V, para. 2(d); (4)
notifying qualified suppliers of their status on such lists, id. art. V, para. 2(e); and (5)
annually publishing an enumeration of permanent lists including their title, the products to
be purchased, conditions of qualification, their duration and the formalties for their renewal,
id. art. V, para. 6(a).
148. These instances are: (1) the absence of response to open or selective tendering, or
when tenders are collusive, nonconforming or from unqualified suppliers; (2) the product can
only be acquired from one source, e.g., patents, copyrights or works of art; (3) the circum-
stances call for extreme urgency brought about by unforeseeable events; (4) the subsequent
purchase of additional or replacement parts by anyone other than the original suppliers
would cause the replacement of existing equipment; and (5) the purchase of prototypes or a
first product for research, experiment, study or original development. GPA, supra note 7,
art. V, para. 15. In addition, the Code requires that a written report be filed with each single
tender award. This report must contain the name of the entity, the value and type of product
procured and the country of origin. The report must be retained for purposes of future
disputes. Id. art. V, para. 16.
149. Id. art. VI, paras. 2, 4-5.
150. Id. art. VI, paras. 5-7. This procedure includes complaints arising at any phase of
the procurement process, including the post award period. Id. The disclosure of confidential
information which would impede law enforcement, be contrary to the public interest,
prejudice the legitimate commercial interest of particular enterprises or might prejudice fair
competition between suppliers, however, shall not be revealed without formal authorization
from the party disclosing the information. Id. art. VI, para. 8.
151. Id. art. VI, para. 5. Article VI provides that "[t]here shall . . . be procedures for
the hearing and reviewing of complaints arising in connexion with any phase of the procure-
ment process, so as to ensure that, to the greatest extent possible, disputes . . . will be
equitably and expeditiously resolved between the suppliers and the entities concerned." Id.
152. Strauss, supra note 2, at 1347.
153. GPA, supra note 7, art. VII. For a discussion on the effectiveness of the Code's
enforcement provisions by way of a comparison with GATT's enforcement mechanism, see
Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 44, at 1330-32.
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ments involved. 5 4 Upon failure to reach a settlement, the Com-
mittee may then step in to make recommendations or rulings. The
ultimate sanction is denial of the benefits of the Code.155
III. UNITED STATES AND JAPANESE
PROCUREMENT UNDER THE CODE
Discriminatory government procurement constitutes a sub-
stantial impediment to international trade.15 6  With the Code now
in effect, a potential world market of approximately $33 billion has
been opened up to foreign bidding. 5 7  United States and Japanese
procurement represents more than half of this figure. 5 8 Their
efforts to comply fully with the Code will be crucial to eliminating
government procurement barriers in world trade.15 9
A. United States Implementation
On July 26, 1979, the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 was
approved by Congress. 60  United States implementation of the
Code is found in Title III of the Act, which was ordered into effect
on January 1, 1981.11 Title III gives the President the authority to
waive federally mandated buy-national laws, regulations, proce-
154. CPA, supra note 7, art. VII, paras. 3-5.
155. Id. art. VII, paras. 6-14.
156. See Note, Technical Analysis of the Government Procurement Agreement, 11
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1345 (1979).
157. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 60, at 527. This figure is limited to the potential
government procurement market opened up as a result of the Code. It therefore does not
account for purchases of non-signatory countries nor exclusions under the Code. See id.
Another source estimates this figure to be as high as $50 billion. See Bus. WEEK, Dec. 29,
1980, at 50.
158. United States procurement under the Code is estimated at $17.5 billion, Japan's at
$8 billion. See 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 464, 465 (1981).
159. See note 30 supra. See also note 290 infra.
160. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2582 (Supp. III 1979). As an executive agreement, the Code
does not ipso facto preempt United States discriminatory government procurement legislation
such as the Buy American Act. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 creates the authority to do
so, and is carried out by Executive Order No. 12260 of Dec. 31, 1980, 46 Fed. Reg. 1653
(1981) and the Determination of the Special Trade Representative, 46 Fed. Reg. 1657 (1981).
This discrepancy created by the implementation process had been an issue of concern for
Japanese suppliers. They feared that the Trade Agreements Act's provisions would not
conform with the Code. See WISE MEN'S REPoRT, supra note 25, at 93-94. Since the Trade
Agreements Act is what prempts the Buy American Act, it would be the Trade Agreements
Act, not the Code, that would govern on appeal.
161. 19 ,U.S.C. §§ 2511-2518 (Supp. III 1979); see S. REP. No. 249, supra note 60, at
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dures and practices under four circumstances,162 and to order a
prohibition on goods procured by countries that fail to reciprocate
under the terms of the Code.163  This waiver applies only to the
Buy American Act and to those labor surplus set-aside laws which
do not affect minority or small businesses.' 6 4  Several laws and
regulations which would appear to contravene the Code's provi-
sions are not affected.' 6 5
In its implementation of the Code under Title III, the United
States should incorporate into current laws and regulations certain
publication requirements and data dissemination guidelines.' 66  In
contrast to other countries with less visible forms of government
procurement,'6 7 the United States will not have to make more than
minor adjustments in its procedures.'16 Good faith adherence to
162. 19 U.S.C. § 2511(a) (Supp. III 1979). These four circumstances are: (1) the
country is a party to the Code and provides "appropriate reciprocal competitive government
procurement opportunities to United States products and suppliers of such products," id. §
2511(b)(1); (2) the country is unwilling to become a party under the multilateral obligations
of the Code, but nonetheless assumes de facto the procedural obligations with respect to the
United States by signing a bilateral agreement, id. § 2511(b)(2); (3) the country is a non-sig-
natory to the Code and is unwilling to assume its procedural obligations, but agrees to
provide reciprocal competitive opportunities, id. § 2511(b)(3); and (4) the country is among
the "least" developed countries, id. § 2511(b)(4). See also S. REP. No. 249, supra note 60, at
519. As a major industrial country, Japan is eligible for a waiver only in the first circum-
stance.
163. Id. § 2512(b)(3). When the President grants any waiver, he must enact a prohibi-
tion on the procurement of goods from all countries which did not obtain a waiver. Id. §
2512(a). The prohibition is immediately effective for major industrial nations, but may be
delayed up to two years for other countries. Id. § 2512(b)(1). See also S. REP. No. 249, supra
.note 60, at 519-20.
164. Pomeranz, supra note 15, at 1294. See notes 46-52 supra and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Buy American Act. For a discussion of the labor surplus set-aside laws,
see MTN ST'UDY, supra note 7, at 269.
165. S. REP. No. 249, supra note 60, at 518. See also TAA of 1979, supra note 3, at
333-35.
166. A discussion of all the affected laws and regulations is beyond the scope of this
Note. There are three general situations where such regulations will have to conform to the
provisions of Title II: (1) when the statutory authority for the regulation violates Title III,
e.g., the Buy American Act; (2) when the regulation is more detailed than the statutory
authority and violates Title III in implementation of the statute, e.g., when the time allowed
for submission of a particular bid is shorter than allowed by Title III, (3) when the organic
authority for the regulation resides in the executive branch. See MTN STUDY, supra note 7, at
233, 237.
167. See Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 44, at 1309. See also, e.g., Goldstein, supra
*note 33, at 69-70 n.39; S. REP. No. 249, supra note 60, at 514.
168. See S. RE'. No. 249, supra note 60, at 514.
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the Code by foreign signatories should provide important new op-
portunities for United States exporters.16 9
B. Japanese Implementation and
the NTT Agreement
1. Japanese Implementation
The Code entered into force on January 1, 1981.170 Under its
provisions, an estimated $8 billion of Japan's procurement is now
open to international competition.' 71  Affected are all of Japan's
central governmental ministries and agencies, 172 including three
quasi-public corporations: the Japan National Railways (JNR),' 73
the Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation (JTS)' 74 and the
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTT). 175
In principle, implementation of the Code reforms many of the
previously mentioned discriminatory practices of Japan. 76  Appli-
cation of the various transparency requirements of the Code poten-
tially imposes regularity and uniformity in Japan's procurement
procedures.177  Since publicizing of procurement announcements is
now centralized and each agency's purchasing regulations are in
conformity with the Code,17  discretionary procurement practices
should be limited and, in any event, subject to guidelines which
prohibit discriminatory conduct. 79  Minimum time limits for al-
169. See id. at 533. R. BALDWIN, THE MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-ToWARD
GREATER LIBERALIZATION? 16 (1979). See Anthony & Hagerty, supra note 44, at 1339-42.
170. GPA, supra note 7, art. IX, para. 3.
171. Bus. AM., FEB. 9, 1981, at 39.
172. GPA, supra note 7, Annex I.
173. The JNR is a public corporation similar to NTT, and under the nominal control of
the Ministry of Transportation and Construction. The JNR operates nearly 80% of Japan's
railway network, and represents 90% of the Japanese market for railway equipment. See
Wel & Click, supra note 12, at 887-89.
174. The JTS is a public corporation under the Ministry of Finance. It virtually controls
Japan's entire tobacco market through the manufacture, import, sale and distribution of
tobacco products, See Weil & Click, supra note 12, at 886-87. In December, 1980, Japan
announced that it would facilitate foreign market entry of tobacco products, including a
tariff reduction of up to 55% on cigarettes, cigars and pipe tobacco. See Bus. AM., Feb. 9,
1981, at 39.
175. See note 12 supra.
176. See notes 78-133 supra and accompanying text.
177. See WISE MEN'S REPORT, supra note 25, at 63.
178. See notes 135-37 & 139 supra and accompanying text. See also, e.g., Bus. AM.,
May 18, 1981, at 13-15.
179. Article If of the Code provides the general rule of non-discriminatory treatment.
CPA supra note 7, art. II. See also note 116 supra and accompanying text. Article V, for
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lowing firms to respond to proposals, 80 provisions for the disclosure
of information about procurement documentation,' 8 1 tendering in
the presence of all bidders'82 and constraints on the use of pre-estab-
lished lists 183 promise to put foreign suppliers on an equal footing
with domestic firms. Since the use of negotiated private procure-
ment is now restricted under the Code, 18 4 the number of long
established purchaser-supplier "family" relationships should be re-
duced.811 Furthermore, a foreign supplier's access to post qualifica-
tion and post award information should ensure full compliance
with these procedures.18
2. The NTT Agreement
Concluded as a result of protracted negotiations between the
United States and Japan over entity coverage under the Code,8 7 the
example, states that the selection of suppliers to participate in tendering shall be "in a fair
and non-discriminatory manner." GPA supra note 7, art. V, para. 5.
180. There has been an extension of the minimum time period between tender an-
nouncements and the close of bidding from 10 to 30 days. This is consistent with the Code.
See also notes 98 & 138 supra and accompanying text; see, e.g., NIPPON TELEGRAPH &
TELEPHONE PUBLIC CORPORATION SPECIAL REGULATIONS FOR HANDLING GOODS PURCHASE
CONTRACrS (English Translation), arts. 9.2, 10.2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as NTT SPECIAL
RGULATIONS].
181. This is in conformity with the Code. See notes 135-137 & 139 supra and accompa-
nying text; see, e.g., NTT SPECIAL REGULATIONS, supra note 180, arts. 9, 12.
182. This follows the Code's provisions. GPA, supra note 7, art. V, para. 14(d); see,
e.g., NTT SPECIAL REGULATIONS, supra note 180, art. 19.
183. See notes 103-07, 139 & 147 supra and accompanying text; see, e.g., NTT Agree-
ment, supra note 18, Attachment I, paras. 12, 19, 22.
184. See notes 97, 108-11 & 148 supra and accompanying text; see, e.g., NTT SPECIAL
REGULATIONS, supra note 180, art. 24.
185. See note 107 supra and accompanying text.
186. See notes 141 & 149-53 supra and accompanying text; see, e.g., NTT Agreement,
supra note 18, Attachment I, para. 20.
187. The NTT Agreement has its origins in a United States trade mission visit to Japan,
in the fall of 1978, for the purpose of promoting United States exports. In light of the United
States' technological strength in the telecommunications field, the trade mission visited the
Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Public Corporation (NTT), and demanded that the Japa-
nese telecommunications agency open its doors to United States manufacturers. IRJ, supra
note 10, at 84. The President of NTT made an untimely statement that there were not many
items to be purchased from the United States "excepting housecloths and buckets." Id. This
comment enraged many United States businessmen who had been trying unsuccessfully to
export goods to Japan. NTT soon became a symbol to United States manufacturers and
officials of Japan's "unfair" closed market policies. Id. See also U.S.-JAPAN TRADE REPORT,
supra note 12, at 29. During the discussions at the Tokyo Round of MTN on government
procurement, the United States pressed hard to have Japan include the NTT in the list of
governmental entities covered under the Code. NTT was considered the only governmental
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bilateral NTT Agreement entitles the United States to $1.8 billion
of NTT's public telecommunications procurement. 18 This is in
addition to NTT's $1.5 billion of non-public telecommunications
purchases covered under the Code.18 The NTT Agreement repre-
entity whose purchases were of sufficient quantity and technological advancement to provide
the necessary reciprocity of procurement opportunities. Japan reluctantly consented to in-
clude NTT in its procurement offer. See NTT HEARING, supra note 4, at 13 (statement of W.
Douglas Newkirk). Bilateral talks continued after the Tokyo Round. Now that NTT was
included as an entity under the Code, discussions focused on the amount of NTT's purchases
that would be covered, particularly telecommunications equipment. See IRJ, supra note 10,
at 84-85. A joint statement was issued in June, 1979, calling for Japan and the United States
to reach an agreement on NTT coverage no later than December 31, 1980. If a settlement
could not be reached at that time, both countries had the option of rescinding their procure-
ment offers. Joint Statement of June 2, supra note 16. The negotiations had to resolve major
differences. The United States wanted NTT to include a greater portion of its procurement
under the Code, and to subject those purchases to open competitive bidding. It feared that
anything less than open competitive bidding would dilute the purposes of the Code. Further-
more, the American Electronic Industry Association (EIA) had voted unanimously that the
only acceptable outcome of the NTT talks was a complete open coverage by NTT under the
Code. See ECONOMIC WORLD (Feb. 1981) at 43; U.S.-JAPAN TRADE REPORT, supra note 12, at
28. Japan maintained the position that merely its offer to purchase telecommunications
equipment exceeded the scope of the Code. Its need to maintain quality products, however,
prevented it from opening all contracts to competitive bidding. IRJ, supra note 10, at 84-85.
The practice of single tendering had long been maintained by NTT with a view towards
maintaining a higher degree of reliability in the equipment. Also, joint development projects
for new types of equipment was felt to require closed bidding with dependable firms. Id.
Japan's fear that adoption of the Code would result in a lower standard of products, was a
major stumbling block in the negotiations. NTT HEARING, supra note 4, at 14 (statement of
W. Douglas Newkirk). Japan believed that the Code ignored quality control and gave total
priority to price competiton. See BUSINESS JAPAN, Nov. 1980, at 30. In addition, during the
process of securing implementing legislation for the agreements pursuant to the MTN, the
Japanese government had made a commitment to the Diet not to concede to Code coverage
of NTT's purchases of "public telecommunications equipment." Full coverage of NTT under
the Code would also give other MTN signatories, most notably the European Economic
Community, non-reciprocal access to NTT's procurement. NTT HEARING, supra note 4, at
15 (statement of W. Douglas Newkirk).
188. NTT Agreement, supra note 18. The United States and Japan settled on a two-part
procurement package. A liberal interpretation of "non-public telecommunications equip-
ment," provided for an increase of NTT's formal Code procurement offer to almost half of its
annual purchases. The rest of NTT's public telecommunications purchases, approximately
$1.8 billion, would be open only to United States manufacturers under the bilateral agree-
ment committing NTT to procurement procedures consistent with Code obligations. Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, Dec. 2, 1980, at 1, col. 1. A major reason for the Agreement's conclusion
was the understanding that was reached concerning the flexible nature of the Code. See
Hormats, supra note 10, at 21. Based on this understanding both parties made concessions.
Japan offered to increase its purchasing by open bidding from $600 million to $1.5 billion.
The United States agreed to accept the three-stage formula proposed earlier by Japan. Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, Nov. 29, 1980, at 3, translated by The American Embassy, Tokyo, Political
Section (Dec. 5, 1980) (copy on file at the Japan Society Library).
189. Id.
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sents a major attempt by the United States to rectify its current
trade deficit with Japan by opening procurement in a field where
United States firms are highly competitive internationally-tele-
communications. 190 In addition to opening telecommunications
procurement to the United States, the Agreement embodies a prom-
ise by Japan to facilitate foreign access to its interconnect market. '9'
The Agreement sets forth three types of NTT procurement
procedures, Track I, Track II and Track 111.192 Track I applies to
all NTT purchasing of non-public telecommunications equip-
ment. 19 3  This area of purchasing is subject to bids by suppliers
from all Code signatories. 9 4  Tracks II and III cover all public
telecommunications procurement.19  Only firms from the United
States are granted the right to bid in this area. 19 Track II refers to
purchases of "off the shelf" public telecommunications equip-
190. Indeed, NTT symbolized this bilateral trade "friction." A United States House
Report issued prior to the United States-Japan settlement on government procurement pro-
vides in pertinent part: "NTT is the single biggest opportunity for increased U.S. sales to a
Japanese Government agency, and the failure to achieve progress in the NTT negotiations
stands as the symbol of remaining Japanese industrial trade protectionism and her unfair
approach to trade in high technology products." U.S.-JAPAN TRADE REPORT, supra note 12, at
29. See also notes 32 & 187 supra and accompanying text.
191. NTT Agreement, supra note 18, Joint Statement. Since the interconnect market
involved private users, this issue is separate from government procurement. Nonetheless,
NTT's approval is necessary in order to connect private leased-line equipment into Japan's
telecommunications system. See note 20 supra. On December 26, 1980, the Ministry of Posts
and Telecommunications (MPT) authorized a deregulation for its international private
leased-line telecommunications carrier, the Kokusai Denshin Denwa Co., Ltd. (KDD). The
MPT's approval allows the use of multiple processing centers in Japan and overseas-a new
market for foreign manufacturers. See Bus. AM., Feb. 9, 1981, at 40.
192. NTT Agreement, supra note 18, Attachment I, para. 2.
193. See Id. Covered under Track I are:
1. General Materials-poles, hardware, clothing and paper, fuel, furniture,
stationery, and purchases by local branch offices.
2. Non-Telephone Type Terminals and Machineries-computers (off-line or
stapd-alone use), peripheries for off-line computer systems, memory materials for
computer systems, measuring instruments, power supply (storage batteries, engine
generators, power receiving sets, transformers), conduits, vehicles, data terminal
equipment, keyboard displays, marketsheet readers, magnetic card readers, key-
board printers, magnetic character readers, PBX and private line switching equip-
ment, modem and network control units, facsimile (group 1,2,3 machines), and
protective devices.
3. Planned New Services-video information retrieval terminals, and teleme-
tering service terminals.
Bus. Am., Aug. 24, 1981, at 2.
194. Id.; see note 19 supra.
195. NTT Agreement, supra note 18, Attachment I, para. 2.
196. id.; see notes 19 & 23 supra.
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ment.1 7  Track III covers high technology public telecommunica-
tions equipment still in the experimental or developmental stage. 98
NTT's Track I procurement is covered by both the Code and
the NTT Agreement. 9 Therefore, the NTT Agreement does not
spell out Track I's procedures.2 00  Instead, its procedures are set
forth in NTT regulations pursuant to Japan's implementation of the
Code.2 0 ' The procurement procedures under Track I involve pre-
qualification,2 02 tender offer2 0 3 and contract award.20 4  The pre-
qualification process is intended to screen out unreliable firms.
2 05
First an application is filed with NTT .201 Then NTT proceeds with
an examination of the supplier's credentials.20 7  If the firm is pre-
197. This means "equipment which is available in the market place and which can be
placed in service as it is or is capable of being modified as required." PROCUREMENT PROCE-
DURES FOR PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT (English Translation) 3 (1981) [herein-
after cited as PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS GUIDEBOOK]. Track II equipment includes
switching systems, carrier transmission equipment, radio units, on-line computers, cable and
telephone apparatus. Id. NTT has also announced that it will purchase digital echo suppres-
sors. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 30, 1981, at 8, col. 3.
198. Covered under Track III are switching systems, carrier transmissions equipment,
on-line computers, radio equipment, cable and telephone apparatus. Public Telecommunica-
tions Guidebook, supra note 197, at 3. NTT has opened bidding for Japanese-language
teletex terminals and automobile telephones. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 30, 1981, at 8, col.
3.
199. See NTT Agreement, supra note 18, Attachment I, para. 2.
200. See id. Attachment I.
201. See NTT SPECIAL REGULATIONS, supra note 180, art. 1. Track I's procedures for
United States suppliers are as follows: (1) A pre-qualification notice appears in the Kampo;
(2) A translated copy is sent to the United States for dissemination; (3) United States firms
request pre-qualification documents from NTT; (4) NTT inspects the United States firm's
credentials; (5) NTT sends notice of pre-qualification results; (6) NTT issues tender to the
United States firms which have successfully pre-qualified; (7) United States firms submit
bids; and (8) NTT awards the final contract. See Bus. AM., Aug. 24, 1981, at 3-4.
202. See NTT SPECIAL REGULATIONS, supra note 180, arts. 7,8.
203. See id. arts. 9-20.
204. See id. art. 21.
205. See note 96 supra.
206. See NTT SPECIAL REGULATIONS, supra note 180, arts. 7, 8. NTT is required to
specify the conditions of tendering qualifications in the initial Kampo pre-qualification notice
each and every fiscal year. Id. art. 7.2; GPA, supra note 7, art. V, para. 2.
207. This process involves two steps. First there is a disqualification step where any firm
that "has committed any misconduct with respect to the quality and/or quantity of any
[p]roduct" or "conspired with .. .other . . . persons at any tendering with an intention to
tender up or down the contract price," etc., may be excluded from participating in any NTT
procurement. NTT SPECIAL REGULATIONS, supra note 180, art. 6. Second, once a firm has
met these basic conditions, then it will be examined "in terms of the size of operation,
business standing, production capacity, technical capability and various other requirements
..." based on the particular product to be purchased. Id. art. 7.1.
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qualified, it is placed automatically on a list of eligible firms.208
NTT issues a tender offer directly to the supplier.2 09  Bids are then
opened to all tenderers at a time and place designated by NTT.2 10'
Then follows the final contract award. 21 1
Tracks II and.III are not covered by the Code.2 12  Nonetheless,
NTT is committed to making these Tracks consistent with Code
obligations.13 In several key areas Tracks II and III mirror the
Code's transparency provisions. These Tracks require that procure-
ment information be publicized,'2 1 4 applications be handled in an
equitable manner2 15 and unsuccessful applicants be given reasons
for rejection.10
208. See id. art. 8.3. As of October, 1981, NTT's Track I procurement has been
exclusively selective tendering. Under selective tendering only a portion of all qualified
bidders need be invited as long as there is "optimum effective international competiton." See
GPA, supra note 7, art. V, para. 5. Thus far NTT has not had to determine a portion of
qualified bidders because all qualified bidders have been invited. Telephone conversation
with J. Urayama, Deputy Director of the New York Office of the Nippon Telegraph &
Telephone Public Corporation, in New York City (Oct. 23, 1981). See also Bus. AM., Aug.
24, 1981, at 3.
209. See NTT SPECIAL REGULATIONS, supra note 180, arts. 4, 10, 11. A notice of the
proposed purchase must also be published in the Kampo. Id. art. 9.1; GPA, supra note 7, art.
V, para. 3. The notice must allow at least 30 days before the closing of tenders, but this may
be shortened to 10 days in the case of a recurring contract or five days in an emergency. NTT
SPECIAL REGULATIONS, supra note 180, art. 9.2; GPA, supra note 7, art. V, para. 10. A
summary of the proposal must also be publicized in one of the official languages of GATT.
Id. art. 9.4; GPA, supra note 7, art. V, para. 4. Tenders solicited by either direct solicitation
letters issued by NTT or by notice in the Kampo must be treated equally. NTT SPECIAL
REGULATIONS, id. art. 10.3.
210. NTT SPECIAL REGULATIONS, supra note 180, art. 19; CPA, supra note 7, art. V,
para. 14.
211. NTT SPECIAL REGULATIONS, supra note 180, arts. 19, 20; CPA, supra note 7, art.
V, para. 14.
212. See notes 248-54 infra and accompanying text.
213. Article V of the Code states that the signatories "shall ensure that the tendering
procedures of their entities are consistent with [Article V's] provisions ...... GPA, supra
note 7, art. V, para. 1. The NTT Agreement provides in pertinent part, "In our view, these
Procedures are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Code, in particular, Article V. In
addition to implementing the Procedures, the NTT will also fully observe the requirements of
the Code." NTT Agreement, supra note 18, letter of Dr. Saburo Okita, para. 3.
214. See generally PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS GUIDEBOOK, supra note 197, at 5-30;
CPA, supra note 7, arts. V, VI.
215. As set forth in the Code, procurement documentation is to be furnished to suppliers
on a timely basis. All such documentation must contain information necessary to permit
responsive applications. Suppliers are given at least thirty days to respond. Moreover, any
inquiries regarding either procurement proposals or procurement documentation shall be
promptly addressed by NTT. Amendments or clarifications are to be provided simul-
aneously to all interested suppliers in a timely manner. Tracks II and III also provide that
contracts will be awarded to the "most advantageous" applicant(s) in terms of the criteria set
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By eliminating pre-qualification and the opening of bids in
public, Tracks II and III simplify the procedures called for by the
Code.21 7  A firm wishing to submit a bid under these Tracks must
request procurement documentation from NTT and then return a
completed application with supporting documents. 218  This is fol-
lowed by an extensive examination of the supplier's background,
sample products and manufacturing facilities based on criteria
specified in the procurement documentation.1 9 Selected appli-
cants are provided with procurement specifications and then
awarded contracts. 220  A thorough processing of applications,
forth in notices or procurement documentation. If it appears that no applicant is obviously
the most advantageous, NTT will in subsequent negotiations give equal consideration to all
applicants within the competitive range. See generally PUBLIc TELECOMMUNICATIONS GUIDE-
BOOK, supra note 197, at 5-30; GPA, supra note 7, art. V.
216. NTT will also facilitate the review of its procedures by informing unsuccessful
applicants in writing of the final outcome of each contract award. Complete records will be
kept of all matters concerning such awards. Unsuccessful applicants requesting reasons for
the rejection of their bids will be promptly furnished such information. Further, an enumera-
tion of qualified suppliers will be published annually in the Kampo, including relevant
information regarding inscription to pre-established lists. See NTT Agreement, supra note
18, Attachment I; GPA, supra note 7, arts. V, VI.
217. Instead of having a pre-qualification step as in Track I, Tracks II and III consoli-
date this step into one "selection" process. See PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONs GUIDEBOOK,
supra note 197, §§ 5.5, 6.5. Applicants are not selected by an opening of bids in the presence
of all bidders, as is required under Track I. See notes 182 & 210 supra and accompanying
text. When NTT formulated this three track system, it looked to the procurement procedures
of the United States Department of Defense and the General Services Administration and
struck a balance somewhere between them. Conversation with K. Kubo, Senior Staff Engi-
neer of the New York Office of the Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Public Corporation, in
New York City (Sept. 29, 1981).
218. See PUBLIc TELECOMMUNICATIONS GUIDEBOOK, supra note 197, §§ 5.4, 6.4.
219. Track II provides eight criteria to select successful applicants. An applicant should
have: (1) high quality products compatible with NTT's existing systems and lower in price;
(2) sufficient technical development ability; (3) satisfactory financial resources and "main-
tains excellent technical standards and production facilities;" (4) "ample knowledge about
public telecommunication;" (5) sufficient production and marketing experience; (6) stability
of product supply, quality and price; (7) the ability to meet NTT's demands over a long
period; (8) the ability to cooperate, assist in training, service repairs and replace parts. Id. §
5.5(2). Nine criteria are used in Track III procurement. NTT will expect an applicant to
have: (1) high quality products and research and development which is compatible with
NTT's existing systems and lower in price; (2) sufficient research and development ability and
resources; (3) the ability to cooperate with NTT in research and development projects; (4)
satisfactory financial resources and "maintains excellent technical standards and production
facilities;" (5) "ample knowledge about public telecommunication;" (6) sufficient production
and marketing experience; (7) stability of product supply, quality and price; (8) the ability to
meet NTT's demands over a long period; (9) the ability to cooperate, assist in training,
service repairs and replace parts. Id. § 6.5(2).
220. See id. §§ 5.7-5.8, 6.7-6.8. Tracks II and III also provide for "follow-on" procure-
ment, designated by either Track II-A or Track III-A. Follow-on procurement refers to NTT
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therefore, ensures NTT that manufacturers will be able to meet its
standards for product reliability and quality control.221
A significant feature of the NTT Agreement is Track III,
which sets forth detailed provisions for purchasing telecommunica-
tions equipment under joint research and development pro-
grams.222  Representing over half of NTT's annual procurement,
this category offers the most lucrative and technologically advanced
contracts for United States suppliers. 2 3  Track III procurement,
however, presents unique problems with respect to bringing high
technology telecommunications purchasing in conformity with the
Code's non-discriminatory principles. First of all, joint research
and development projects often result in the creation of new tech-
nologies. NTT may feel compelled to develop these technologies
domestically by awarding contracts to Japanese firms, thereby giv-
ing them a competitive edge over United States suppliers .224 Sec-
ondly, the close cooperation necessitated by joint projects may
cause NTT to turn to domestic suppliers simply because such close
dealings with United States firms may be difficult logistically. 25
purchases of products which it previously purchased either under Track II or Track III, and
is applicable only to firms which have already been awarded contracts. (Under certain
circumstances a company may be placed directly in Tracks II-A or III-A if, for example, its
product is sufficiently advanced to exempt it from the selection process. One United States
firm, Motorola, Inc., became eligible for Track III-A procurement as a result of having a
superior quality automobile telephone.) Once a firm is awarded an initial contract it becomes
a "qualified supplier," and is placed on a permanent list. Such a designation is published in
the Kampo as part of any procurement proposals of follow-on purchasing. As a matter of
principle, NTT will place orders with these designated qualified suppliers for goods previ-
ously purchased under Tracks II and III. NTT will annually place in the Kampo an
announcement of its fiscal year procurement requirements under Tracks II-A and III-A. Any
new suppliers who wish to bid must apply through NTT's selection process. To be awarded a
contract, a new firm must demonstrate that its products are better or cheaper than those
being procured by designated qualified suppliers. See PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS GUIDE-
BOOK, supra note 197, § 7.4. Although follow-on procurement is administratively convenient
it restricts competition because qualified suppliers are presumptively given purchasing or-
ders. Furthermore, new suppliers are only able to find out about follow-on purchases on an
annual basis. Follow-on procurement probably represents NTT's largest purchases for tele-
communications equipment. NTT's fiscal 1981 follow-on procurement for Tracks II-A and
III-A is projected to be approximately $1.8 billion. NIPPON TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE PUBLIC
CORPORATION, PUBLIC NOTICE ON PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIP-
MENT, Aug. 28, 1981.
221. See notes 187-88 supra.
222. PuBLIc TELECOMMUNICATIONS GUIDEBOOK, supra note 197, § 6.7.
223. See Bus. WEEK, Dec. 29, 1980, at 50. This includes Track III-A "follow-on"
procurement. See note 220 supra.
224. See U.S.-JAPAN TRADE REPORT, supra note 12, at 26.
225. This has already occurred to a Japanese supplier in the United States. See note 272
supra.
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The NTT Agreement's primary purpose is to provide non-
discriminatory access to NTT's procurement opportunities. 2 1  As
part of this objective, the Agreement is designed to achieve specific
solutions to procurement problems in the telecommunications in-
dustry, namely the minimizing of incidences of product failure22 7
and the handling of research and development projects. 2 8  If sue-
cessfully implemented, its basic framework should be transferable
to other areas of sophisticated government procurement.2 29
Although the Code and the NTT Agreement are designed to
impose regularity and transparency in procurement procedures, 230
they still allow ample room for the exercise of discretion in favor of
domestic suppliers. 231  For example, the Code allows procurement
officials to limit the number of potential suppliers if the number is
"'consistent with the efficient operation of the procurement sys-
tem. 12 32 Even greater room for abuse is provided in Tracks II and
III of the NTT Agreement, which allows NTT to conduct a
"'closed" selection process.2 33  This permits a wide latitude for de-
termining the specific criteria by which firms will be determined
"most advantageous." Since fairness of the procedures depends
largely on the good faith of government agencies, it is essential for
both Japan and the United States to monitor closely each phase of
government procurement implementations.234
226. See NTT Agreement, supra note 18, letters of Dr. Saburo Okita and Reubin O'D.
Askew. In addition, NTT's procurement procedures under the Agreement should become
systematized and open, allowing NTT to select its suppliers from a larger pool of applicants.
Greater competition should permit NTT to purchase reliable foreign products at competitive
prices. This should give NTT greater confidence in establishing relationships with foreign
manufacturers. See PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS GUIDEBOOK, supra note 197, § 1. See also
note 8 supra.
227. See note 187 supra.
228. See notes 187 & 222-25 supra.
229. See NTT HEAINc, supra note 4, at 45-46 (statement of Robert Cassidy).
230. See notes 176, 186 & 226 supra and accompanying text.
231. See notes 96, 107 & 113 supra and accompanying text.
232. GPA, supra note 7, art. V, para. 5.
233. See PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS GUIDEBOOK, supra note 197, §§ 5.5, 6.5; see also
note 217 supra.
234. Of all the agreements concluded at the MTN, the Government Procurement Code
will probably require the most careful monitoring. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 60, at
533. The United States government and the Communications Division of the United States
Electronic Machine Industry Association (EIA) will closely monitor NTT procurement under
the Code. ECON. WORLD, Feb. 1981, at 43. See NTT HEARINc, supra note 4, at 17 (statement
of W. Douglas Newkirk). See also note 267 infra accompanying text.
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a. recent developments,
It is important to examine the framework and purposes of the
NTT Agreement in light of concrete developments. As of January
1981, NTT began implementing the first phases of its obligations
under the NTT Agreement. 23 5 Notice of qualification for its first
round of procurement was published in the Kampo, and applica-
tions were sent to all interested firms.236
Early on, a problem arose relating to the application proce-
dure used by NTT to select bidders. Foreign firms complained that
the procedure was too complicated and meticulous.23 7  The lack of
time given potential bidders to comply with applications posed
another problem.238 This placed domestic firms or foreign firms
with branch offices or subsidiaries in Japan at a distinct advan-
tage.2 39  These problems were addressed in NTT's second round of
qualification screenings, which featured the simplification of proce-
dural requirements. 240  In addition, a system was developed by the
United States to translate procurement documents and disseminate
them to United States suppliers.24' By the end of February, thirty-
six firms were eligible to participate in NTT's first round, involving
235. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Feb. 3, 1981, at 8, col. 4.
236. NIPPON TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE PUBLIC CORPORATION, PUBLIC NOTICE CONCERN-
ING THE EXAMINATION OF QUALIFICATIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS IN COMPETITIVE BIDDING, Jan.
10, 1981.
237. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Feb. 3, 1981, at 8, col. 4. The applications went so far as
to require personal career information on engineering staffs and the disclosure of business
secrets. Id.
238. Under the NTT Agreement, NTT must allow a minimum of 30 days for a supplier
to respond. See note 180 supra and accompanying text. The Department of Commerce was to
be blamed in part for not issuing a translation of the solicitation notice until early February.
NTT had made the announcement on January 10 and applications were open until the end of
February. JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE, JAPAN INSIGHT, No. 11, at 9 (Mar. 20, 1981).
239. Small foreign firms without the resources of larger firms are the primary losers.
One way of overcoming this problem is to use a Japanese trading company as an agent. See
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Feb. 3, 1981, at 8, col. 4.
240. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Mar. 24, 1981, at 9, col. 3.
241. The system works as follows:
[Ajnnouncements of NTT's proposed purchases, as well as qualification procedures,
are cabled by the Foreign Commercial Service to Washington [D.C.] and dissemi-
nated to U.S. firms through the computer-based Trade Opportunity Program. Key
information is also published in Commerce Business Daily. The complete NTT
tender documents are obtained and sent back to Washington via courier service.
Bus. AM., May 18, 1981, at 15.
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several items of Track I equipment.2 42  Fifteen of these firms were
newcomers.2 43 Most were from the United States. 244
Simultaneously, efforts were being made by Japan, pursuant
to the NTT Agreement, to open its market of customer-provided
lease-line equipment (interconnect).245  In the Agreement, NTT
had promised to adopt type-approval methods and to accept testing
data from abroad, which effectively would simplify product ap-
proval procedures.2 46  Again complaints arose because of the com-
plexity of the applications. 47 These applications were subse-
quently simplified, and in March one United States company that
had attempted to penetrate the interconnect market for several
years was granted product approval.2 48
In April, NTT announced two more rounds of Track I pro-
curement.2 4  Nine United States firms qualified. 250  In addition,
an interconnect seminar was sponsored in Washington, D.C. and in
Los Angeles to inform United States firms about NTT's new proce-
dures and technical requirements for type-approval. 251  A similar
seminar was held in Tokyo in May.252 By early June, a procure-
ment guidebook and several technical pamphlets had been pub-
lished in English by NTT. 253 Later that month, a seminar was held
in Tokyo to help United States firms obtain a working understand-
ing of NTT procurement procedures and the telecommunications
industry in Japan. 254  At the end of June an announcement was
made for the first purchasing of three telecommunications items
under Tracks II and 111.255 By this time, four United States com-
242. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Mar. 24, 1981, at 9, col. 3.
243. Id. This included domestic firms which were previously excluded from the NTT
"family." See also note 107 supra.
244. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Mar. 24, 1981, at 9, col. 3.
245. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Jan. 13, 1981, at 9, col. 2.
246. See NTT Agreement, supra note 18, Joint Statement.
247. See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Apr. 14, 1981, at 9, col. 1.
248. Plantronics, Inc., of Santa Cruz, California, obtained NTT's type certification for
headphone transmitter-receiver equipment. Id.
249. See NTT HEARING, supra note 4, at 25 (statement of Raymond J. Waldmann).
250. Id. at 18 (statement of W. Douglas Newkirk).
251. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 16, 1981, at 9, col. 1.
252. Id.
253. Id. This went beyond the requirements of the NTT Agreement, and indicates
NTT's "genuine change in receptivity to foreign suppliers." JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE,
JAPAN INSIGHT, No. 28, at 4 (July 24, 1981).
254. JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE, JAPAN INSIGHT, No. 28, at 4 (July 24, 1981).
255. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, June 30, 1981, at 8, col. 3.
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panies had been awarded procurement contracts for Track I equip-
ment. 25
b. assessment
It is too early to draw any conclusions about the NTT Agree-
ment. 257  By examining each party's responsibilities and by deter-
mining criteria to be used in evaluating the Agreement's implemen-
tation, however, some light may be shed on the potential
effectiveness of the NTT Agreement and its impact on United
States-Japan bilateral relations.2 58
NTT's responsibilities include the prompt publicizing of tender
proposals and the publishing of procurement information necessary
to render its purchasing accessible to United States manufac-
turers.219  These responsibilities also involve giving United States
firms fair treatment in the application and bidding processes.260
Good faith on the part of NTT will be required.26' The recent
developments indicate that NTT has, to a substantial degree, dem-
onstrated its commitment to the Code's principles by closely adher-
ing to, and sometimes going beyond, the terms of the NTT Agree-
ment. 26 2
256. UNITED STATES EMBASSY, TOKYO, NTT AWARDs CONTRACTS TO FouR U.S. COM-
PANIES, CABLE REPORT #2686 (1981) (copy on file at the Fordham International Law Journal
office).
257. It may take up to two years before any valid conclusions can be made. See NTT
HEARING, supra note 4, at 50 (statement of Robert Cassidy).
258. Id. at 48-52.
259. Id. at 48-49.
260. See notes 213-16 supra and accompanying text.
261. See notes 230-35 supra and accompanying text; see also NTT HEAINC, supra note
4, at 48-49 (statement of Robert Cassidy).
262. NTT HEARING, supra note 4, at 19 (statement of W. Douglas Newkirk). United
States Trade Representative William Brock reported in a recent Joint Economic Committee
hearing before the International Trade Subcommittee that "the professionalism and thor-
oughness that were evident in [NTT's procurement] seminars indicates the sincerity with
which Japan is undertaking its obligations [and) ... we are optimistic that the prospects for
sales of high-technology American products are improving significantly as a result of the steps
that both governments are taking." See JAPAN ECONOMIC INSITUTE REPORT, No. 31, Aug. 14,
1981. Perhaps NTT's good faith can be attributed to events which coincided with the NTT
Agreement's negotiation and implementation. As a result of an accounting scandal, NTT's
former President, Tokuji Akikusa, resigned on January 5, 1981. Replacing him was an
"'outsider", Hisashi Shinto, the first person from the private sector to head NTT. Nihon
Keizai Shimbun, Dec. 30, 1980, at 2, col. 4. This new management has created a catalyst for
reform in NTT, and opened the way for international competition. See Bus. WEEK, May 4,
1981, at 67. NTT is taking steps to disband its former "family" of suppliers and will
encourage those companies whose businesses may be under-cut by foreign suppliers to
develop new markets. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Aug. 11, 1981, at 9, col. 1.
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The responsibility of United States manufacturers is to learn
about the procurement process in order to compete effectively for
NTT awards.263 A serious effort on the part of United States firms
must be made to penetrate a highly competitive Japanese telecom-
munications market.2 64  This requires not only an active response
to NTT's proposals, but also an incessant effort to surmount the
commerical realities of doing business in Japan.265  Judging from
the events of recent months, it is apparent that several manufac-
turers have made a serious effort to bear this responsibility. 266
The United States and Japanese governments should cooperate
closely to monitor the Agreement and to respond to any complaints
or disputes which may arise. 2 7  The United States government in
particular must delineate the areas of responsibility between the
United States Trade Representative and the Department of Com-
merce to oversee implementation of the Agreement .268
263. NTT HEARING, supra note 4, at 49 (statement of Robert Cassidy).
264. One United States company, Motorola, Inc., negotiated for two years before being
accepted by NTT as a qualified supplier of pocket beepers (used by doctors). It has been
awarded a significant contract for its diligence. JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE, JAPAN INSIGHT,
No. 11, at 9 (Mar. 20, 1981). In an effort to establish an environment more favorable to
United States exports, the United States Congress has addressed various legislative incentives.
For example, the tax burden on United States citizens living and working abroad has been
eased. Congress is also considering export trading company legislation, and amending the
1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. See JAPAN ECONOMIC INSTITUTE REPORT, No. 31, Aug.
14, 1981, at 5-8.
265. See note 112 supra and accompanying text. To penetrate the Japanese market, it
goes without saying that one must understand the manner in which business is conducted in
Japan. For example, buyer-supplier relationships in Japan are perceived on a serious, per-
sonal level, especially in the initial stages of establishing the relationship. While a United
States buyer who encounters a defective product may, without too much consternation, take
it back to the manufacturer to be replaced, in Japan such a defect would cause considerable
loss of confidence in the supplier. Thus, Japanese business practice requires a new supplier,
domestic or foreign, to demonstrate his sincerity by meeting extremely strict standards. See
NTT HEARING, supra note 4, at 49 (statement of Robert Cassidy).
266. See note 265 supra and accompanying text. As of October 20, 1981, six United
States firms have been awarded contracts. Conversation with J. Urayama, Deputy Director
of the New York Office of the Nippon Telegraph & Telephone Public Corporation, in New
York City (Oct. 25, 1981).
267. See note 234 supra and accompanying text. The NTT Agreement provides its own
procedures for non-binding arbitration. Any dispute arising out of the agreement which
cannot be settled through consultation will be subject to an advisory report of a tribunal of
three arbitrators, to be concluded within one year. NTT Agreement, supra note 18, Attach-
ment II.
268. On June 9, 1981, a House of Representatives hearing was held before the Subcom-
mittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the Committee on
Energy and Commerce to discuss the implementation of the NTT Agreement. One of its
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An assessment of the NTT Agreement's implementation will
require time.2 69 Although the most obvious basis for this assess-
ment is whether United States firms are awarded contracts, other
factors must also be considered.2 70 This is because the amount of
awards granted to or withheld from United States suppliers does
not necessarily reflect the degree to which Japanese procurement
practices are discriminatory. Instead, it might indicate relative
competitive standing or commercial realities. 271
A successful implementation of the NTT Agreement will have
a dual effect on bilateral relations between the United States and
Japan. First, assuming that United States telecommunications man-
ufacturers are competitive abroad, fair and open access to NTT
procurement and Japan's interconnect market should ideally result
in the reduction of the current trade deficit with Japan. 272 Greater
main purposes was to clarify the areas of authority between these two offices in monitoring
the implementation of the NTT Agreement. Pursuant to the Trade Agreements Act of 1979,
such authority is divided between the United States Trade Representative and the Depart-
ment of Commerce. One witness stated
that the greatest weakness in U.S. international trade policy is in overseeing imple-
mentation of existing agreements. Generally speaking, neither Congress nor succes-
sive administrations have allocated sufficient resources to oversight of implementa-
tion. . . . If there is no sign of interest, then the foreign governments and the U.S.
business community usually assume that the issue is no longer of political impor-
tance. If concern is expressed as bombastic attacks on the foreigners then the result is
a negative reaction by the foreigners which usually prohibits effective impelmenta-
tion. The right balance depends entirely upon the details of the agreement at hand
and the time in the agreement's history at which the oversight activity occurs.
NTT HEAING, supra note 4, at 47-48 (statement of Robert Cassidy).
269. See note 257 supra and accompanying text. A careful record of each contract
should provide a statistical basis for evaluation. See NTT HEARNG, supra note 4, at 8
(statement of John Sodolski). Both the Code and the NTT Agreement require that such
records be kept. GPA, supra note 7, arts. V, para. 16, VI, para. 9; NTT Agreement, supra
note 18, Attachment I, para. 20. The Department of Commerce is presently preparing an
extensive report to submit to Congress on the implementation of the NTT Agreement. JAPAN
ECONOMIC INSTITUTE, JAPAN INSIGHT, No. 28, at 4 (July 24, 1981).
270. See NTT HEAUNG, supra note 4, at 19-20 (statement of W. Douglas Newkirk). See
also note 23 supra.
271. During the NTT Agreement's negotiations, NTT offered $2.3 billion worth of
equipment to be allocated for foreign procurement. IRJ, supra note 10, at 85. The United
States rejected this "quota" approach, stating that although it might benefit United States
manufacturers initially, it could cause injury to long-term United States industrial interests.
Furthermore, such an approach would have defeated the Code's purpose-procurement
based on competition in the open market place. See NTT HEAMNG, supra note 4, at 51
(statement of Robert Cassidy).
272. In addition to telecommunications equipment, United States sales of industrial
products should be competitive in computers and related peripherals, various electronic
components, process control units, biomedical instruments, electronic industry production
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exports to Japan should deflate perceptions in the United States that
Japan is unfairly and excessively exporting to the United States
while maintaining an impenetrable market at home. 273  Second,
the efforts by Japan and NTT to open procurement to foreign
firms, if continued in good faith, should indicate a Japanese will-
ingness to share a greater burden in its bilateral economic and
strategic partnership with the United States.2 74  This willingness
should lead to a clearer demarcation of responsibilities, which
would be favorable to the long term interests of both nations.275
CONCLUSION
The successful conclusion of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral
Negotiations represents a significant step toward eliminating non-
tariff barriers to trade. Through the multilateral framework estab-
lished by the GATT, the Government Procurement Code attempts
to reduce one NTB by providing for non-discriminatory guidelines
in government procurement contracts. It is hoped that the United
States and Japan can effectively implement these guidelines. Apart
from implementation, however, the successful negotiation of the
and test equipment, aircraft, avionics and ground support equipment and building systems
and materials. Bus. AM., Feb. 9, 1981, at 40. Pursuant to mutual reciprocity under the
Agreement, United States procurement will also be opened to competition from Japan. In the
United States, most of the telecommunications purchases are conducted by privately owned
companies, and are therefore exempt from the provisions of the Code. Anthony & Hagerty,
supra note 44, at 1314 n.75. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. (ATT), is by far the
largest supplier of telecommunications services in the United States and.conducts two-thirds
of its purchasing through its subsidiary, Western Electric, Inc. Pursuant to the NTT Agree-
ment, the United States is committed to the encouragement of non-discriminatory access to
ATT's purchases by Japanese manufacturers. A recent Federal Communication Commission
(FCC) deregulation of ATT is designed to ensure that ATT buys from suppliers other than
Western Electric. Wall St. Journal, Oct. 19, 1981, at 26, col. 3. Current events indicate,
however, that the United States' tendencies to buy-national may create problems in the
future regarding the NTT Agreement. For example, ATT recently denied a contract award
to a Japanese supplier, Fujitsu Ltd., for the purchasing of a fiber optic communications
system. Fujitsu had offered the lowest bid, but was rejected simply because it was a foreign
supplier. Some of the reasons cited for the rejection were: national interest; logistical prob-
lems of developing technology with a foreign company; and advantages that such technologi-
cal development would mean for the United States. Wall St. Journal, Oct. 30, 1981, at 56,
col. 1. See also notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
273. See notes 31-33 supra and accompanying text.
274. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
275. See Allison, Productive Partnership: Productive of What and for Whom? (keynote
speech delivered on Sept. 14, 1981, at the Japan Society, New York, N.Y.) reprinted in THE
JAPAN SociErY Nxwsu=-rs 2-4 (Oct. 1981). See also note 32 supra.
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NTT Agreement by the two largest government purchasers of all
the Code signatories2 7 is a favorable precedent in the direction of a
comprehensive international- system of government procure-
ment.2 77  The NTT Agreement is a significant extension of the
Code. It provides unprecedented procurement procedures address-
ing the handling of product reliability and research and develop-
ment in the telecommunications industry.2 78
The Government Procurement Code expressly provides that
future negotiations are to be held with a view toward expanding
the Code's scope and coverage. 279  With the implementation of the
NTT Agreement, the United States and Japan are now in a position
to appeal to other countries such as the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC) and Canada to open up their public Postal Tele-
graph and Telephone Systems (PTTs) .280 Other problems of Code
interpretation and implementation should await clarification in
future discussions. 281
Dayne Kono
276. See S. REP. No. 249, supra note 60, at 527. See also note 158 supra and accompa-
nying text.
277. See note 30 supra and accompanying text; see also NTT Hearing, supra note 4, at
45-46 (statement of Robert Cassidy).
278. The NTT Agreement has been described as "by far, the most detailed arrangement
relating to government procurement in existence today." NTT Hearing, supra note 4, at 45
(statement of Robert Cassidy).
279. CPA, supra note 7, art. IX. The NTT Agreement conforms to this provision and
calls for the review of the Agreement in three years. If the arrangement should prove
satisfactory, it will be renewed for another three years. NTT Agreement, supra note 18,
letters of Dr. Saburo Okita and Reubin O'D. Askew.
280. It will be difficult for the United States and Japan to pursuade the EEC and
Canada to open their telecommunications procurement, as both the United States and Japan
have had trade surpluses with respect to the EEC and Canada. In addition, the EEC has had
considerable difficulty in establishing European wide standards for telecommunications
equipment, and has allocated a meager 10% of PTT telecommunications procurement to be
opened to non-European telecommunications companies established in Europe by 1986. See
NTT HEARING, supra note 4, at 42 (statement by Robert Cassidy). See also note 78 supra.
281. For example: the floating nature of SDR's; the definition of service contracts,
national security and public welfare interests; and the question of regional or local govern-
ment interference with the Code's provisions. See generally MTN STUDY, supra note 7.

